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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to determine the return on energy efficiency 
investments in domestic and deployed military installations. This research considers two 
current options for increasing energy efficiency at military installations: the use of 
Energy Savings Performance Contracts to fund energy efficiency improvements at 
domestic military installations, and the use of waste-to-energy generators at deployed 
military installations. 
In domestic military installations, energy requirements are met primarily via 
external utilities. Energy-saving efforts at domestic installations seek to reduce utility 
expenses by private equity investment in energy efficient technologies. In deployed 
military installations, including remote installations and forward military operating bases, 
generators provide the majority of electricity by burning fossil fuels delivered from fuel 
convoys. Deployed installation energy efficiency can be achieved through expanded on-
site use of alternative fuels. By using field waste as a fuel source, the external fuel 
demand at deployed installations can be reduced. Estimated financial returns of these 
energy efficient methods are included in the analysis of this research. This research also 
discusses governmental policies mandating energy efficiency and explains how involved 
parties benefit financially from energy efficiency investments. 
  vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................1 
B. ENERGY USE BY DOMESTIC MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ............1 
1. Financial Cost.......................................................................................2 
a. Cost of Energy Consumption....................................................2 
b. Cost of Noncompliance with Environmental Laws and 
Agreements ................................................................................2 
2. Clean Air Act (CAA) Requirements ..................................................4 
C. ENERGY USAGE AND COST BY MILITARY FORWARD 
OPERATING BASES......................................................................................5 
1. Financial Cost.......................................................................................6 
a. Fuel Cost at Depot.....................................................................6 
b. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel ....................................................8 
2. Additional Burden Cost of Supplies...................................................9 
3. The Case for Battlefield Energy Efficiency .......................................9 
D. WASTE AT FORWARD OPERATING BASES (LMI, 2004)..................10 
E. RESEARCH OUTLINE................................................................................12 
II. PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND .........................................................................15 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: DETERMINING RETURN ON 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS ................................................15 
1. Policy Directives and Financial Incentives ......................................15 
a. Energy Audits..........................................................................15 
b. Executive Order 13423 Strengthening Federal 
Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management..19 
c. Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs).................20 
2. Carbon Emission Reductions............................................................22 
B. DETERMINING RETURN OF ENERGY EFFICIENT 
INVESTMENTS AT MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES...24 
1. Need for Managing Waste at a Military Forward Operating 
Base......................................................................................................24 
2. Waste-to-Energy Conversion Process ..............................................24 
3. Prototype Development of a Tactical Garbage-to-Energy 
Generator............................................................................................26 
a. Project Cost .............................................................................27 
b. Project Performance ...............................................................27 
4. Financial Incentives of Tactical Garbage-to-Energy 
Generators ..........................................................................................29 
5. The Role of Department of Defense Resource Allocation and 
Accounting Processes in Rewarding Fuel Efficiency or 
Penalizing Inefficiency.......................................................................30 
6. Why Deployed Forces Should Become More Fuel Efficient ..........32 
a. Fuel Efficiency in Warfighting System Acquisitions ............33 
  viii
b. Fuel Efficiency Applicability to the Principles of War..........34 
III. OPTIONS FOR ANALYSIS.....................................................................................37 
A. STATUS QUO................................................................................................37 
B. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: CONTINUED USE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY MECHANISMS....................................................................37 
1. Determining the Proper Return Metric-Payback versus Return 
on Investment .....................................................................................38 
2. Additional Requirements of Energy Management Programs .......39 
C. MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES: USE OF WASTE-
TO-ENERGY GENERATORS ....................................................................39 
1. Possible Benefits of a Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Refinery.........40 
a. Reduced External Fuel Need..................................................40 
b. Reduced Fuel Transport Costs in Money and Lives..............40 
c. Reduction of Fossil Fuel Exhaust Released into the 
Atmosphere..............................................................................40 
d. Increased Energy Self-sufficiency in Case of Disruption 
in Fuel Supply .........................................................................40 
e. Reduced Waste ........................................................................41 
f. Reduced Volume Resulting in Reduced Waste Disposal 
Cost ..........................................................................................41 
g. Reduced Military “Waste Signature”.....................................41 
h. Compatibility with Current Equipment..................................41 
i. Model for Civilian Use Elsewhere..........................................41 
2. Possible Financial Savings of Utilizing Waste-to-Energy 
Generators ..........................................................................................42 
IV. METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING RETURN ON INVESTMENT ..........43 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: PROJECT SAVINGS ..........................43 
B. MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES: TGER SAVINGS .......44 
C. ASSUMPTION OF COST VARIABILITY ................................................44 
V. DATA AND COST ESTIMATES ............................................................................45 
A. ESPC SAVINGS.............................................................................................45 
B. TOTAL DELIVERED FUEL DATA FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES......48 
1. Summary of Burdened Fuel and Waste Cost Estimates ................48 
2. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and 
Evaluation) (OSD (PA&E)): Burdened Cost of Fuel......................49 
3. Logistics Management Institute: An Analysis of the Energy 
Potential of Waste in the Field..........................................................51 
a. Cost of Waste Disposal............................................................52 
b. Cost of Fuel Delivery ..............................................................54 
4. Army Environmental Policy Institute Report “Sustain the 
Mission Project: Resource Costing and Cost-Benefit Analysis” ...55 
C. LIFE CYCLE COST COMPARISON OF A WASTE-TO-ENERGY 
GENERATOR VERSUS A STANDARD FIELD GENERATOR............59 
1. Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) Assumptions .............................59 
  ix
2. Generator Life-Cycle Cost Estimates ( LCCE)...............................60 
a. Initial Cost Comparison..........................................................60 
b. Operation and Maintenance Life Cycle Cost Estimates 
(LCCEs)...................................................................................62 
c. Project Return on Investment.................................................64 
3. TGER Payback Calculations ............................................................65 
VI. OBSERVATIONS......................................................................................................67 
A. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................67 
B. THE POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING STANDARD FUEL PRICES 
TO INCLUDE END-TO-END FUEL DELIVERY COSTS ......................68 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................69 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATION RESULTS: THE RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT (ROI) OF ENERGY SAVINGS PERFORMANCE 
CONTRACTS (ESPCs) .................................................................................69 
B. THE VALUE OF ENERGY AUDITS IN DETERMINING THE 
POTENTIAL FOR INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROJECTS.....................................................................................................71 
C. DEPLOYED INSTALLATION RESULTS: THE VALUE OF A 
TACTICAL GARBAGE-TO-ENERGY REFINERY (TGER) AT 
FORWARD OPERATING BASES..............................................................71 
D. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR INVESTMENT IN FUEL EFFICIENCY?..73 
E. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....................74 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................79 
 
  x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. DoD Fee Cost of Environmental Noncompliance [From ODUSD (I&E), 
2006] ..................................................................................................................3 
Figure 2. DoD Bulk Fuel Supply Chain [From Cooper, 2007].........................................7 
Figure 3. Field Waste Content [From LMI, 2004] ..........................................................12 
Figure 4. Research Roadmap...........................................................................................13 
Figure 5. Reallocation of Agency Payments for Energy and Energy-Related O&M 
Expenses [From DOE, 2007]...........................................................................22 
Figure 6. Department of the Navy Energy Usage Reduction Progress Since 1985 
[From energy.navy.mil, 2005] .........................................................................23 
Figure 7. Energy Supply Losses [From Lotspeich, 2003]...............................................24 
Figure 8. Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery Diagram [From Behar, 2007]...............28 
Figure 9. Return on Investment Methodology Flowchart ...............................................43 
Figure 10. Super ESPC Project Investment versus Guaranteed Savings ..........................46 
Figure 11. Military Burdened Fuel Cost by Service and Consumption  [From OSD 
(PA&E), 2006].................................................................................................50 
Figure 12. SMP Contingency Operation Fuel Journey [From AEPI, 2006] .....................56 
Figure 13. Medium-cost Scenario Results for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s 
Energy Use in Contingency Operations [From AEPI, 2006] ..........................59 
Figure 14. Theoretical TGER Production Learning Curve ...............................................61 
Figure 15. Cumulative O&M LCCE Savings ...................................................................63 
Figure 16. TGER Payback Periods ($1.3M initial cost)....................................................65 
Figure 17. TGER Payback Periods ($300K initial cost) ...................................................66 
Figure 18. Super ESPC Project Investment versus Guaranteed Savings  [After: 
www1.eere.energy.gov] ...................................................................................70 
Figure 19. TGER Payback Periods ($1.3M initial cost)....................................................73 
 
  xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $1.3).... xviii 
Table 2. Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $300K) xviii 
Table 3. DoD Emission Total [From ODUSD (I&E), 2006]...........................................5 
Table 4. All Government Super ESPC Data FY1998-FY2007  [After: 
www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007] .........................................................................48 
Table 5. Summary of Delivered Fuel and Waste Disposal Cost Estimates ...................49 
Table 6. Waste Disposal Costs in a Middle Eastern Operating Theater ($/ton) 
[From LMI, 2004]............................................................................................54 
Table 7. Annual TGER O&M Fuel and Waste Disposal Savings .................................63 
Table 8. Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $1.3)........64 
Table 9. Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $300K)....64 
Table 10. All Government Super ESPC Data FY98-07  [After: 
www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007] .........................................................................70 
Table 11. Summary of Delivered Fuel and Waste Disposal Cost Estimates ...................72 
Table 12. Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $1.3)........72 
 
  xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AEPI Army Environmental Policy Institute 
 
bbl/d Barrels of oil per day 
BTU/gsf British Thermal Unit per gross square footage 
 
CAA Clean Air Act 
CG, MNF-W Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West 
CO Carbon Monoxide 
CONUS Continental United States 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 
CY Calendar Year 
 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DESC Defense Energy Support Center 
DFSP Defense Fuel Supply Point 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DLSci Defense Life Sciences LLC 
DoD Department of Defense 
DSB Defense Science Board 
DWCF Defense Working Capital Fund 
 
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
EO 13423 Executive Order 13423 
EPAct 2005 Energy Policy Act of 2005 
ESCO Energy Service Company 
ESPC Energy Savings Performance Contracting/Contracts 
 
FY Fiscal Year 
 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GSF Gross Square Footage 
 
HAPs Hazardous Air Pollutants 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning 
 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IG DoD Inspector General, Department of Defense 
IGA Investment Grade Audit 
 
JLTV Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
JP-8 Jet Propellant-8 
  xvi
LCC Life-cycle Costing 
LCCE Life-cycle Cost Estimate 
LMI Logistics Management Institute 
 
MILCON Military Construction 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 
 
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
NOX Nitrogen Oxides 
 
O3 Ozone 
ODUSD (I&E) Office of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment) 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
O&S Operations and Support (aka O&M, Operations and Maintenance) 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OSD (PA&E) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 
 
Pb Lead 
PM2.5 Fine Particulate Matter 
PM10 Inhalable Coarse Matter 
POD Point of Debarkation 
POE Point of Embarkation 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System 
 
REF Rapid Equipping Force 
ROI Return on Investment 
 
SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SMP Sustain the Mission Project 
SO2 Sulfur Dioxide 
STTR Small Business Technology Transfer 
 
TACOM Tank-automotive and Armaments Command 
TGER Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Refinery 
 
UESC Utility Energy Savings Contracts 
USD (AT&L) Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
 
VOC Volatile Organic Compounds 
  xvii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to determine the return on energy efficiency 
investments in domestic installations and military forward operating bases. 
This report considers two current options for increasing energy efficiency: 
• at domestic military installations, the use of Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPCs) to fund energy efficiency improvements, and 
• at military forward operating bases, the use of waste-to-energy generators. 
 For all domestic government Super ESPCs issued from 1998 to 2007, the 
government is contracted to save a total of $27 million with the contracts relative to 
status quo through the term of the contracts. However, during this same period, private 
lenders will receive the bulk of the utility savings, which is far in excess of government 
savings. Of the forecasted $2.68 billion in utility savings, $1.09 billion will repay initial 
project investments leaving $1.59 billion transferred to the private equity lenders as net 
income. While the government benefits from this arrangement by reducing energy usage 
and complying with Executive Order 13423, private lenders have significant financial 
incentives as well. Returns on investment for equity lenders range from 116 to 224 
percent over the life of the contract. If the government chose to fund the projects and was 
able to reproduce the program management and other behaviors of these commercial 
vendors, it may have realized a $1.59 billion savings after repaying all project investment 
costs. 
In military forward operating bases, a prototype waste-to-energy refinery device 
that converts common field waste into electrical power is being considered as a means to 
reduce the delivered fuel demand of remote locations. Recent studies provide estimates of 
fuel delivery and waste disposal costs that are the foundation for determining the return 
on investment of such a device. Initial procurement costs and subsequent reductions 
therein due to learning effects also impact the return on investment. This research 
considered three fuel burden cost estimates and one burdened waste disposal cost in 
determining the return on investment (ROI) of a tactical-garbage-to-energy (TGER) 
  xviii
device. Initial procurement cost estimates include current prototype unit costs of $1.3 
million and expected production unit costs of $300,000. Return on investment estimates 
vary as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. Vertical headings indicate burdened costs as 
estimated by Logistics Management Institute (LMI), Army Environmental Policy 
Institute’s Sustain the Mission Profile (SMP), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Program Analysis and Evaluation) (OSD). Horizontal headings indicate the expected 
lifecycle of a TGER device. Combinations for positive returns are above the bold line, 
while negative returns are below the bold line. This report includes an analysis of more 
complete savings possible from remote military installation energy efficiency. 
All dollar figures in FY07K$
Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Investment (initial cost difference) 1,275
Cumulative LMI Operating Savings 1,284 2,569 3,853 5,137 6,422 7,706 8,990 10,275 11,559 12,843
LMI Model ROI 1% 101% 202% 303% 404% 504% 605% 706% 807% 907%
Cumulative SMP Operating Savings 269 537 806 1,075 1,343 1,612 1,880 2,149 2,418 2,686
SMP Model ROI -79% -58% -37% -16% 5% 26% 47% 69% 90% 111%
Cumulative OSD Operating Savings 233 465 698 930 1,163 1,395 1,628 1,860 2,093 2,325
OSD Model ROI -82% -64% -45% -27% -9% 9% 28% 46% 64% 82%
Cumulative Unburdened Operating Savings 90 180 269 359 449 539 629 719 808 898
Unburdened ROI -93% -86% -79% -72% -65% -58% -51% -44% -37% -30%  
Table 1.   Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $1.3) 
 
 
All dollar figures in FY07K$
Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Investment (initial cost difference) 275
Cumulative LMI Operating Savings 1,284 2,569 3,853 5,137 6,422 7,706 8,990 10,275 11,559 12,843
LMI Model ROI 367% 834% 1301% 1769% 2236% 2703% 3170% 3637% 4104% 4571%
Cumulative SMP Operating Savings 269 537 806 1,075 1,343 1,612 1,880 2,149 2,418 2,686
SMP Model ROI -2% 95% 193% 291% 389% 486% 584% 682% 779% 877%
Cumulative OSD Operating Savings 233 465 698 930 1,163 1,395 1,628 1,860 2,093 2,325
OSD Model ROI -15% 69% 154% 238% 323% 407% 492% 577% 661% 746%
Cumulative Unburdened Operating Savings 90 180 269 359 449 539 629 719 808 898
Unburdened ROI -67% -35% -2% 31% 63% 96% 129% 161% 194% 227%  
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A. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The purpose of this research is to determine the return on energy efficiency 
investments in domestic installations and military forward operating bases. 
This report considers two current options for increasing energy efficiency at 
military installations: the use of Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) to fund 
energy efficiency improvements at domestic military installations, and the use of field 
waste-to-energy generators at remote, deployed military installations. 
For domestic installations, savings from energy efficiency are the result of 
reduced utility usage as measured by utility bills. The amount of utility savings possible 
determines the amount of capital available for investment in energy efficiency 
improvements. The selection process for determining energy savings potential, the 
availability of investment capital, and presidential requirements to reduce energy 
intensity, are the focus of domestic energy efficiency investments in this report. 
In assessing the return on energy efficiency investments at remote, deployed 
installations, the reduction in total costs as a result of the investment provides a more 
complete savings return. Direct fuel offsets of implementing a field waste-to-energy 
generator provide savings in excess of the cost of the fuel displaced. Reduced waste 
disposal costs, reduced fuel logistics costs, and reduced security concerns contribute to 
the direct fuel offset savings to provide a more complete analysis of the value of energy 
efficiency. This research includes an analysis of more complete savings possible from 
remote military installation energy efficiency. 
B. ENERGY USE BY DOMESTIC MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 
The United States is the world’s largest oil consumer. With consumption 
exceeding 20.5 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d), the equivalent of 861 million 
gallons, the United States consumes nearly three times as much oil as China, the second 
largest oil consumer. Domestic production of oil accounts for 8.3 million bbl/d, requiring 
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12.2 million bbl/d of imported foreign oil (Top World Tables, 2006). Reliance on foreign 
oil for 60 percent of domestic demand requires strong trade partners willing to provide oil 
to the United States. The use of large amounts of fuel for energy production has both 
financial costs and emission control policy requirements. The following sections describe 
these costs and emission policies. 
1. Financial Cost 
The federal government uses massive quantities of energy to power its operations, 
although it accounts for less than 2 percent of total U.S. energy usage. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) is the biggest single consumer of this energy. DoD’s 500,000 buildings 
and facilities consume 75 percent of the energy used by the federal government and  
1 percent of the nation’s energy. The fuel costs fall into two categories: direct and 
contingent, as clarified below. 
a. Cost of Energy Consumption 
In fiscal year (FY) 2005, DoD spent $10.9 billion for 919 trillion site-
delivered British Thermal Units (BTU’s) of energy for use by military installations. 
Based on the 2005 Defense Authorization Bill, this amount represented 15.6 percent of 
DoD’s operations and maintenance budget exclusive of supplemental appropriations 
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 2004). 
b. Cost of Noncompliance with Environmental Laws and 
Agreements  
A DoD facility may be subject to fines and penalties if it is found to be in 
noncompliance with federal, state, or local environmental laws and regulations. This can 
result in fines and penalties that may have a negative impact on DoD’s mission by 
limiting its ability to test new equipment and train personnel or by preventing its use of 
noncompliant facilities and equipment. (ODUSD (I&E), 2006) 
DoD manages environmental compliance activities to ensure full and 
sustained compliance with U.S. environmental laws and overseas environmental 
obligations. These activities maintain robust self-audit and corrective action programs; 
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and identify and correct noncompliance in a timely manner (ODUSD (I&E), 2006). 
Despite its best efforts, occasional instances of noncompliance arise and, as a result, DoD 
is subject to enforcement actions and the associated fines and penalties. DoD makes a 
concerted effort to reduce enforcement actions because they negatively impact on human 
health, the environment, and the mission by diverting resources away from other 
activities. 
Figure 1 shows the trends in fines and penalties assessed from FY2002 
through FY2006. Since FY2002, the amount DoD has been assessed for noncompliance 
has decreased 49 percent. The amount of fines assessed during FY2006 totaled nearly 
$1.2 million, approximately $300,000 less than FY2005. While the dollar amounts of 
noncompliance fees are insignificant compared to the billions of dollars in total energy 
expenditures, such fees represent nonvalue added costs of energy consumption. 
 
 
Figure 1. DoD Fee Cost of Environmental Noncompliance [From ODUSD (I&E), 
2006] 
Energy consumption has both financial and environmental costs. In an 
effort to reduce the energy consumed by the government, several laws requiring 
reductions in government installation energy intensity and emissions, within a time line 
of several years, have been established. 
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2. Clean Air Act (CAA) Requirements 
Air pollutants that are generated from normal DoD operations can cause injury to 
human health, harm the environment, and cause property damage. The CAA regulates 
emissions of these air pollutants from area, stationary, and mobile sources. DoD 
Instruction DoDI 4715.6, “Environmental Compliance,” establishes a framework for 
measuring DoD’s compliance with the CAA. 
DoD’s Compliance Program helps the Department manage air pollutant emissions 
and make appropriate investments to promote the attainment of National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS), while leveraging energy conservation opportunities. DoD 
tracks emissions for both criteria air pollutants and total hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). 
Criteria air pollutants are the six principal pollutants that have NAAQS: 
• ozone (O3) 
• nitrogen oxides (NOX) 
• inhalable coarse and fine particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5, respectively) 
• sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
• carbon monoxide (CO) 
• lead (Pb) 
DoD reports volatile organic compounds (VOCs) with the criteria pollutants 
because VOCs and NOX are precursors to O3, which is not directly reported. Congress 
identified nearly 200 HAPs known to have harmful health effects under the CAA. Most 
of the HAPs are organic compounds, such as benzene, although some are toxic metals 




Table 3.   DoD Emission Total [From ODUSD (I&E), 2006] 
 
DoD reports annually on metrics designed to ensure its activities remain 
protective of air resources. To minimize the impact on air resources, DoD collects 
information on the quantity of regulated air pollutant emissions identified in the laws and 
regulations of the United States or host nation. These are known as Final Governing 
Standards and they reduce energy use and manage the cost of air pollution (ODUSD 
(I&E), 2006). 
C. ENERGY USAGE AND COST BY MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING 
BASES 
The need for fuel supplies is not a new requirement. Thousands of years ago,  
Sun Tzu (1983) wrote in The Art of War about the need for fighting units to maintain 
supply lines—“An Army without its baggage train is lost; without provisions it is lost; 
without bases of supply it is lost.” 
The fuel needs of deployed troops are analogous to the needs of the country. 
Additionally, an overseas presence requires lengthy logistical supply lines to meet the 
needs of deployed troops. These supply lines have increasingly become a target for 
guerilla-style asymmetric warfare against U.S. forces. Military operations highlight both 
the requirement for and vulnerability of military fuel convoys. 
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One of the most well-known examples of a military energy crisis occurred near 
the end of World War II. As U.S. General George Patton raced through France, he 
quickly outran his supply lines and the ability to refuel his trucks and tanks. On  
August 28, 1944, Patton declared, “At the present time our chief difficulty is not the 
Germans, but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go all the way to 
Berlin!” Three days later, despite the efforts of the famed Red Ball Express fuel convoy 
trucks, Patton and his men were stranded dry. The chance to sweep through France into 
Germany soon passed (Tally, 2001). 
Current military operations are also heavily reliant on petroleum-derived fuels. 
According to the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), during April 2006, the U.S. 
military brought a total of 1.29 million gallons of fuel per day into Iraq. From Kuwait 
alone, U.S. troops brought 890,000 gallons of fuel per day across Iraq’s southern border. 
On July 25, 2006, the Commanding General of Multi-National Force-West in Iraq 
(CG, MNF-W) issued a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request for 
renewable energy systems. This request highlighted the operational need for a renewable 
and self-sustainable energy solution capable of reducing the number of fuel convoys, 
while meeting the electricity requirements of forward operating bases. The purpose for 
this request was to decrease the frequency of logistics convoys on the road, thereby 
reducing the danger to U.S. forces. One proposal to meet this requirement is the process 
of generating electricity through conversion of field waste. The amount by which efforts 
to meet this proposal can reduce risk and provide possible financial incentives is one 
focus of this research (Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, 2006). 
1. Financial Cost 
a. Fuel Cost at Depot 
DoD currently prices fuel based on the wholesale refinery price, not 
including the cost of delivery to its customers. This “refinery pricing assumption” 
excludes four key cost-generators: 
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• The true picture of end-to-end fuel utilization is lost to decision making 
• Refinery-pricing does not reflect DoD’s true fuel costs 
• Refinery-pricing actually masks the benefits of energy efficiency 
• Under-pricing by design also distorts platform design choices 
The DESC acts as the market consolidator and wholesale agent for DoD. 
For simplicity in dealing with its service customers, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) establishes a “standard fuel price” annually. The standard price does not 
reflect the cost to the military services of delivering the fuel from the DESC supply point 
to the ultimate consumer, such as via tanker, ship, or aircraft. The cost of delivery is 
absorbed by each military service budget and is spread across many accounts, meaning 
that the actual cost of delivering fuel is not captured by accounting systems and not 
factored into important investment decisions. 




Figure 2. DoD Bulk Fuel Supply Chain [From Cooper, 2007] 
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b. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
The difference between the wholesale price and true cost reflects what the 
services must pay to handle, store, and deliver the fuel. In FY1999, the standard DESC 
fuel mix price (average price of the fuel sold) was $0.87 per gallon, and by FY2007 it had 
increased to $2.14. Fuel inflation over this period far exceeded Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) inflation indices over the same time period. If the fuel inflation 
rates had matched O&M inflation rates, an $0.87 per gallon fuel price in 1999 would 
have risen to only $1.14 in 2007. 
The true cost of this fuel is much higher, with estimates ranging up to 
hundreds of dollars per gallon for Army forces deep into the battlespace. Since these 
costs are not used in economic analyses, it is likely that a suboptimal allocation of 
resources has been the result (DESC, 2007; USD (AT&L), 2001). 
A consequence of using the DESC price is that the logistical cost of 
delivering fuel to platforms is considered free. However, it is possible that about a third 
of DoD’s budget, half of its personnel, and around 70 percent of the tonnage delivered by 
the logistics effort is fuel. The result is that the Services maintain infrastructures to ensure 
fuel delivery, including large and small surface trucking organizations, naval fleet 
tankers, aerial refueling aircraft, and maintenance and logistics organizations, all of 
which contribute to significant overhead costs. Increases in fuel efficiency would 
correspondingly shrink this overhead burden, enabling savings through reductions in 
logistics requirements (USD (AT&L), Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, 
2001). 
Without the full costs of fuel delivery and supporting infrastructure being 
known, understood, and factored into the cost of the fuel, the true benefits of improving 
platform efficiency are not fully considered in acquisition requirements and processes. 
This could create incentives to introduce fuel efficiency into those processes, thereby 
cutting battlefield fuel demand and reducing the fuel logistics structure needed to deploy 
and employ weapons systems. Until policy guidance requires emphasis on weapons 
system fuel efficiency and the true cost of provisioning fuel to end users is gathered and 
  9
understood, there is no financial incentive for leaders, managers, or operators to depart 
from current practices (USD (AT&L), Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, 
2001). 
2. Additional Burden Cost of Supplies 
One cost of transporting battlefield supplies, including fuel, is beyond dollar 
amounts. Many forward operating areas require supply convoys to pass through hostile 
territory en route to their destination. This resupply need became a liability when 
insurgents began targeting convoys coming from Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey. The result 
was an increase in improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against these convoys. At 
times, as many as 30 IED attacks per week occurred (Wagner, 2007). Any convoy 
transporting supplies in hostile territory risks being attacked. Those providing security 
must protect the convoy or risk stranding others dependent on those supplies. This 
security vulnerability is a significant qualitative factor in the overall cost of fuel and other 
supplies, but is not included in the financial calculations. 
3. The Case for Battlefield Energy Efficiency 
U.S. commanders in Iraq have asked the Pentagon for portable renewable energy 
sources (CG, MNF-W, 2006) to cut back on the number of ground convoys that transport 
fuel into Iraq The director of the Rapid Equipping Force (REF), Army  
Colonel Greg Tubbs, is working with a group of energy experts to find commercial 
products that satisfy two major requirements: they must be deployable within 18 months 
and reduce fuel consumption by 40 percent (Wagner, 2007). 
Dan Nolan (COL, USA (Ret.)), head of REF task force’s energy efforts, stresses 
the importance of decreasing the fuel need without diminishing mission capability. The 
need to find small, transportable devices is established by focusing on solutions for 
forward operating bases, where the U.S. military does not plan on having a permanent 
presence (Wagner, 2007). 
Energy production and savings projects taking several approaches are currently 
under development. Three areas of promise include: solar/wind power, field waste-to-
  10
energy conversion, and packaging material-to-energy conversion. These technologies rely 
on either the nontraditional use of resources that are available in the intended operating 
areas or on the reuse of discarded materials. One program being considered focuses on 
the development of a device that utilizes field waste-to-energy conversion to reduce the 
external fuel requirement of forward operating bases. Benefits beyond direct fuel cost 
savings include the reduced need for fuel convoys and significant reductions in waste 
disposal costs. 
D. WASTE AT FORWARD OPERATING BASES (LMI, 2004) 
Waste generated during deployments typically falls into four categories: 
• general solid waste (e.g., paper, wood, plastic, human, and food waste) 
• hazardous waste 
• used petroleum products 
• medical waste 
During an operation, individual units are responsible for disposing of their waste 
until centralized waste disposal operations are in place. The centralized operations often 
become available when semipermanent or permanent base camps are established. 
Waste disposal practices vary by location. In some countries, the Army has taken 
advantage of a developed waste disposal infrastructure after establishing base camps. In 
Kuwait, for example, much of the Army’s waste is disposed of through local facilities. 
In semideveloped areas such as Afghanistan, the Army tends to make more use of 
contractors, either deployed or local. Deployed contractors use the local waste disposal 
infrastructure wherever possible, or otherwise transport the waste to where more 
developed facilities exist. Additionally, Army units in such circumstances often burn or 
bury a good deal of waste. Unfortunately, such disposal sometimes includes hazardous 
materials, which are supposed to be handled separately. Used oil often is sold to local 
nationals, who use it as fuel. 
The burning or burying of waste is common in host countries with little or no 
waste disposal infrastructure. Depending on its content, the burning or burying of waste 
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can have adverse local environmental effects and be an irritant to local residents. In 
undeveloped or deployed areas, local unit commanders usually decide how waste is to be 
handled. Burning and burying are typical, though local nationals may collect some of the 
solid waste and recycle a portion of it. 
The primary motivation for Army waste disposal is to avoid health threats to the 
troops. To unit commanders, the most important thing is to rid themselves of the waste, 
not necessarily to dispose of it in the most environmentally benign way. For this reason, 
environmental concerns sometimes are addressed only if they coincide with health 
concerns. For example, some units will mix hazardous or medical waste with general 
waste, or bury used lubricants rather than dispose of them in accordance with American 
domestic standards. These practices are most common when units are moving rapidly and 
have little accountability (LMI, 2004). 
A 2004 study by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) analyzed the value of 
waste in the field. In characterizing military waste, data was gathered at  
Fort Irwin, California, where military units conduct field training operations. The waste 
streams of Fort Irwin were found to be analogous to those of actual field-deployed units. 
With regard to waste generation, Figure 3 shows that LMI found: 
• approximately 79 percent of the waste is potentially convertible into fuel; 
• much of the waste is made up of wood, cardboard, plastic, and food; and 
• a deployed soldier generates an average of 7.2 pounds of convertible solid 
waste per day (LMI, 2004). 
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Figure 3. Field Waste Content [From LMI, 2004] 
 
E. RESEARCH OUTLINE 
This research examines the return on investment of possibilities for complying 
with mandates to increase energy efficiency at domestic and deployed installations. 
Chapter II provides background on mandates to increase energy efficiency and methods 
used to assess potential energy cost savings. Chapter III discusses ways to create energy 
savings as well as possible qualitative and quantitative metrics for measuring energy cost 
reductions. Chapter IV describes the methodology used in this research for determining 
cost reductions and returns. Chapter V provides data from previous studies and computes 
comparative life-cycle cost estimates for traditional and proposed energy projects. These 
estimates are used to assess the return on investment of energy efficiency projects. 
Chapters VI and VII present research observations, findings, and conclusions. Each 




Figure 4. Research Roadmap 
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II. PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: DETERMINING RETURN ON ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS 
1. Policy Directives and Financial Incentives 
Most annual energy expenditures are paid for via accounts designated for 
Operations and Support (O&S). In each Service, these O&S accounts pay for energy 
utilities as well as civilian salaries, training, maintenance, fuel, supplies, and repair parts. 
O&S expenditures are annual funds that can only be spent for the needs of the year for 
which they are appropriated. Most energy efficiency projects do not have a one year 
payback and therefore, any investment with O&S funds would force a reduction in other 
aspects of O&S spending for that year. Commanding officers have little incentive to 
invest now in a project that will not pay dividends until years after their tour of duty is 
completed. Additionally, O&S funds are not intended as investment or military 
construction (MILCON) funds. Financial savings from energy efficiency projects benefit 
O&S accounts, while the funding required to implement those projects usually comes 
from investment or MILCON funds. This timing, cost, and benefit structure provides 
little incentive to invest in energy saving projects. 
Recent guidance from senior government officials offers ways to address these 
concerns and provides options for financing energy efficiency projects. Several ongoing 
efforts seek to increase the energy efficiency of military installations and to reduce the 
financial and environmental costs of energy consumption. One important element of 
these efforts is the energy audit. 
a. Energy Audits 
This section discusses the role that energy audits play in determining the 
most effective use of investment dollars for installation energy efficiency projects. The 
term “energy audit” is defined below, followed by a discussion of military facility energy 
audit requirements. The three major types of energy audits are described, with an 
explanation of energy conservation versus efficiency and methods for determining project 
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cost effectiveness. An overview of Executive Order 13423 illustrates mandated energy 
reduction requirements. Finally, conclusions regarding the continued use of energy audits 
at government installations are presented. 
One of the first steps in determining the potential for economically viable 
energy reduction is conducting an energy audit. An energy audit seeks to identify all of 
the energy streams into a facility and to quantify energy use according to its discrete 
functions. An energy audit is analogous to the monthly closing statement of an 
accounting system. One series of entries consists of amounts of energy that were 
consumed during the month in the form of electricity, gas, fuel, oil, steam. The second 
series lists how the energy was used for lighting, air conditioning, heating, etc. The 
energy audit process must be carried out accurately enough to identify and qualify the 
energy and cost savings that are likely to be realized via investment in an energy savings 
measure (Thumann, 2003). 
Energy audits evaluate current energy usage and assist installations in 
determining the best locations to incorporate energy savings measures. The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) requires federal agencies to audit approximately  
10 percent of their facilities each year. Since doing so may be cost prohibitive, DoD 
components are encouraged to use either appropriated funding or alternative financing 
through ESPC projects to conduct their energy audits (EPAct, 2005). 
The “Scoping” Audit. This cursory examination of a facility and its 
energy-using systems is often not much more than a walk-through to determine whether 
the potential exists for an economically viable project. This preliminary work determines 
whether a much more expensive “engineering feasibility” study is warranted. The 
scoping audit includes a basic description of the facility, its function, information on 
energy-using systems, and gross energy use. During a scoping audit, a simple descriptive 
inventory of energy-using systems and equipment is assembled along with nameplate 
data, age, and notes on condition. Utility and other energy bills are reviewed and, where 
appropriate, energy indices are calculated. Quick calculations are made that suggest 
possible energy savings. These preliminary calculations are designed primarily to provide 
enough information to determine whether a detailed engineering audit is justified. The 
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scoping audit costs money, but it is “cheap insurance” when compared to the cost of an 
engineering feasibility study that was not warranted. If an energy scoping audit suggests 
that an opportunity for a viable project exists, and the government agency agrees, then a 
detailed engineering feasibility study is conducted (Hansen, 2003). 
The Engineering Feasibility Study. This study builds on the preliminary 
data provided in the scoping audit, but substitutes measurements for estimates and 
verification for approximation. It examines facility use and patterns to determine 
function, occupant loads, timing, and all of the other factors that influence energy usage. 
The building shell is evaluated to determine points of energy loss or opportunities for 
improvements. Lighting is examined with particular care. The auditor will rarely take the 
word of building occupants or facility managers as to run time; thus, actual measurements 
are almost always justified. Heating, cooling, and other equipment is evaluated and 
required temperature, humidity, air exchange rates, and other environmental parameters 
are carefully noted. All energy-using equipment is inventoried and its condition noted, 
along with hours of operation and energy required. This type of audit is often referred to 
as a “traditional” energy audit. 
At least 12 months’ worth of utility bills are examined, with attention to 
demand charges and load profiles. Rate schedules are checked to ensure the correct rates 
are being charged. Impressive “energy savings” are often the result of applying the 
correct rate schedules. In some instances, a review of rate schedules finds that facilities 
have previously been undercharged for utilities and now are liable for the cumulative 
difference of hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars (IG DoD, 2002). Weather 
statistics for similar time periods may be important if variations from normal weather 
patterns have been sufficient to have a significant bearing on energy use and the measures 
under consideration are temperature dependent. 
Equipment maintenance and the skill level of personnel performing 
maintenance impact energy consumption. This information provides a basis for 




training needed to run it. The objective of this training is to assure that any new 
equipment will operate near design and projected energy savings will be achieved 
throughout the life of the project. 
Equipment additions, replacements, modifications, or improvements are 
recommended based on calculated payback periods, and are selected with the expectation 
that certain energy efficient improvements will be achieved (Hansen, 2003). 
Investment Grade Audit (IGA). Based on the premise that energy 
efficiency is an investment and not an expense, an IGA should offer an investor a reliable 
guide to the investment potential of recommended efficiency measures. In addition to the 
scoping audit and engineering feasibility study, the IGA considers additional economic 
and financial factors. 
A detailed examination of the ownership and financial solvency of the 
facility owners has been incorporated into the technical feasibility study. Many lending 
institutions require a checklist of financial health to be completed by the facility owners 
prior to considering a financial package for an energy efficiency project. The cost of 
money—even its availability—depends on the risks associated with a given project. A 
strong IGA that has clearly addressed potential risks is reassuring to financiers. A major 
function of an IGA, therefore, is to present the identified risks, document the possible 
management mitigating strategies, and assess the total impact on the project. Creating a 
“bankable” project depends heavily on the information provided in an IGA. While more 
costly than a traditional audit, these additional IGA costs can easily be offset by lower 
interest rates as well as the ease of obtaining financing (Hansen, 2003). 
Energy conservation and energy efficiency are often used interchangeably 
despite having unique meanings. Energy conservation means using less energy. Energy 
efficiency means using what must be used as efficiently as possible. In manufacturing, an 
old machine that uses 10 units of energy to produce 100 widgets may be replaced by a 
new machine that uses 15 units of power, but produces 200 widgets. While more energy 
is required for the machine, less energy is required per widget. That is efficiency, but not 
conservation. A machine that produces 80 widgets with 9 units of energy demonstrates 
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conservation, but not efficiency. A machine that produces the original 100 widgets with 9 
units of energy would demonstrate both conservation and efficiency, while a machine 
that produces 90 widgets with 10 units of energy exhibits neither conservation nor 
efficiency. Efficiency measures will tend to increase the overall cost effectiveness better 
than conservation efforts alone. 
b. Executive Order 13423 Strengthening Federal Environmental, 
Energy, and Transportation Management 
Signed by President Bush on January 24, 2007, Executive Order 13423  
(EO 13423) increases several efficiency and conservation goals previously set in earlier 
Executive Orders and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Clinton, 1999). Among other 
requirements, EO 13423 sets forth federal agency goals of improving energy efficiency 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, through reduction of energy intensity by  
3 percent per year or 30 percent in sum through FY2015, relative to FY2003 energy use 
baselines. EO 13423 also directs the implementation of renewable energy generation 
projects on agency property for agency use (Bush, 2007). 
It is important to note that EO 13423 does not set goals in terms of cost 
reductions. While cost reductions should follow use reductions, the volatility of energy 
prices causes a moving cost target that is beyond the control of government departments. 
Reductions in use are both measurable and controllable by the departments, making them 
ideal qualities to be subjected to an audit. 
Energy intensity is predominately measured in terms of British Thermal 
Units per gross square footage (BTU/gsf). Because this unit takes into account changes in 
the overall size of the agency installation square footage, it is more a measure of 
efficiency than conservation. 
To meet the requirements of EO 13423, agencies must conduct energy 
audits to identify projects that have strong potential for energy savings as a result of 
initial investments in energy efficient projects. Once projects with strong savings 
potential are identified, the agency must determine the best way to pay for them. 
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c. Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) 
On August 3, 2007, James L. Connaughton, Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President, issued a memorandum to the 
heads of executive branch departments and agencies directing the increased use of ESPC 
programs. These contracting programs utilize private investment capital to finance energy 
efficient programs at government installations. The savings from reduced energy usage 
are then used to pay off the capital investment and investor “debt service.” This 
memorandum estimates that in order to meet EO 13423 goals, agencies must invest 20 
percent of their annual energy costs in efficiency enhancements, half of which must be in 
the form of ESPCs. Since 1985, federal agencies have invested almost $7 billion in 
energy efficientcy improvements, half of which has come from ESPCs. Cumulative 
savings as a result of these projects is estimated to be as high as $8.5 billion 
(Connaughton, 2007; Kaufmann, 2007). 
ESPCs with federal agencies are subject to review by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and other auditing entities in the federal government. The 
audit opinions that ESPCs have received in the past are mixed. 
In 2001, The Army Audit Agency’s Consulting Report No. AA01-718 
“Audit of Energy Savings Performance Contracts” concluded that compact fluorescent 
light bulbs could save approximately $16.2 million and 640 million kilowatt hours 
compared to existing incandescent light bulbs over the life-cycle of the investment. These 
projected energy and monetary savings were agreed to by the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) and the Office of the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Facilities and Housing (Army Audit Agency, 
2001). 
Not all ESPCs are so universally accepted by both federal agencies and 
contractors. In 2000, an Army Audit Report determined that baseline energy statistics 
were inaccurate primarily because of malfunctioning electrical and gas meters and 
incorrect meter readings. The report concluded that Fort Polk, Louisiana overpaid the 
contractor at least $1,238,000 from January 1994 through June 2000 for energy savings. 
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The report recommended that the Commander, Joint Readiness Training Center, and  
Fort Polk recoup the overstated payments (Army, 2000). Whether intentional or 
accidental, the inaccuracies stress the specific importance of energy audits in providing 
additional oversight to energy-related government contracts. 
ESPCs, like all government contracts, allocate risk between the service 
provider and the United States government. ESPC is a means of using utility savings to 
pay for all project costs and is considered the most cost-effective means of completing 
building energy upgrades that were not funded via direct appropriations. There are many 
types of investment projects, such as energy-management systems, interior and exterior 
lighting, boiler replacement or repair of steam systems, and replacement of Heating, 
Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC). This form of contracting normally guarantees 
project investment costs, utility savings, and performance of installed equipment, with the 
majority of risk borne by the contractor, not the government. 
The Department of Energy explains: An ESPC project is a partnership 
between the customer and an energy service company (ESCO) (DOE, 2006, June). The 
ESCO conducts a comprehensive energy audit and identifies improvements that will save 
energy at the facility. In consultation with the agency customer, the ESCO designs and 
constructs a project that meets the agency’s needs and arranges financing to pay for it. 
The ESCO guarantees sufficient savings to at least pay for the project over the term of the 
contract. After the contract ends, all additional cost savings accrue to the agency. 
Contract terms up to 25 years are allowed (DOE, 2006, June). Figure 5 illustrates the 
allocation of energy and energy-related expenses before, during, and after an ESPC. 
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Figure 5. Reallocation of Agency Payments for Energy and Energy-Related O&M 
Expenses [From DOE, 2007] 
 
Since 2005, more than 400 federal ESPC projects, in 46 states, by  
19 federal agencies have generated $5.2 billion in energy cost savings. The use of ESPCs 
is ideal for organizations that seek out alternative means of funding programs. As the 
discretionary portions of the DoD budget continue to become strained, high competition 
for those funds may leave critical programs dry (DOE, 2006, June). 
Many facilities throughout DoD were built shortly after World War II and 
have not been replaced. Dated DoD equipment and assets—such as the B-52 bomber, 
SH-60 helicopter, and many others—are continuously being funneled additional funds. 
This funding is higher than normal funding would be for these assets due to increased 
maintenance, poor fuel economy, dated insulation techniques, and lack of funding to 
support replacements. Thus, DoD continues to live with existing problems. The ESPC is 
a means to cut costs, while continuing overall functionality of facilities and assets. 
2. Carbon Emission Reductions 
Federal mandates prior to EO 13423 required reductions in energy intensity for 
military installations. From 1985 to 2005, Navy and Marine Corps installations reduced 
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energy intensity by approximately 30 percent. Figure 6 illustrates energy intensity 
reductions during this period for the Department of the Navy (DON). 
 
Figure 6. Department of the Navy Energy Usage Reduction Progress Since 1985 
[From energy.navy.mil, 2005] 
 
Few energy-consuming activities directly provide their own energy supply on site. 
Most installations, whether civilian or military, receive power from power plants that 
must convert chemical energy to mechanical energy to turn generators, which, in turn, 
produce electrical energy. This electricity must be transmitted across several miles and 
voltage step down transformers, followed by additional engineering losses, before being 
applied to its final purpose (e.g., powering an air conditioning unit). However, powering 
the air conditioner is not the end state; maintaining a comfortable temperature is the 
desired outcome. The conditioned air must be delivered to the required area suffering 
heat gain along the way. Such process losses are similar to the theoretical system 
illustrated in Figure 7. Provided the input to output ratio remains constant at 10 to 1, a 10 
percent reduction in energy demand could prevent the processing of 10.5 units of energy 
input. While installation specific numbers may differ, this reduction in demand energy 





Figure 7. Energy Supply Losses [From Lotspeich, 2003] 
 
B. DETERMINING RETURN OF ENERGY EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS AT 
MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES 
This section addresses the need for managing waste at a military forward 
operating base. Then, the general issue of converting waste to energy is outlined, 
followed by an emerging technology to accomplish this waste-to-energy task at a forward 
operating base. 
1. Need for Managing Waste at a Military Forward Operating Base 
Managing waste at military forward operating bases can impact unit security, 
logistics, and financial cost. Sections I.D. and III.C.1.e.-g. of this research further 
addresses the impact of waste management at forward operating bases. 
2. Waste-to-Energy Conversion Process 
All organic waste contains energy. Oil, coal, wood, and garbage all contain heat 
energy that is released when burned. The amount of heat energy in each substance 
determines how much energy is released. Heat amounts for diesel fuel and coal are higher 
than for wood and solid waste. One gallon of diesel fuel contains about the same energy 
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as 28 pounds of municipal waste. The amount of energy in one ton of solid waste  
(9.945 Million BTU/short ton) is approximately the same as in one ton of wood  
(9.961 Million BTU/short ton) (EIA, 2005). 
Extracting energy from organic sources is certainly not a new idea. Humans have 
been burning organic materials in the form of wood, oil, and trash for thousands of years. 
Coal, the combustible sedimentary rock created from organic plants that lived millions of 
years ago, provided the fuel for the Industrial Revolution and is still the most widely used 
fuel for production of electricity in the United States and worldwide. In 2005, more than 
half (51 percent) of the country’s 3.9 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity used coal as its 
source of energy (EIA-Annual Energy Review, 2006). 
Waste-to-energy plants generate enough electricity to supply almost three million 
households (1 percent of the U.S. total). However, providing electricity is not the major 
advantage of waste-to-energy plants. In fact, it costs more to generate electricity at a 
waste-to-energy plant than it does at a coal, nuclear, or hydropower plant. The major 
advantage of burning waste in a large-scale domestic incinerator is that it reduces the 
amount of garbage buried in landfills (National Energy Education Development Project, 
2006). 
The average American creates more than two cubic yards of waste per year. The 
residual ash from combustion of this waste occupies one-eighth the unburned volume. 
For every one landfill of ash, seven landfills of unburned waste are not required (National 
Energy Education Development Project, 2006). 
Harnessing the energy of organic materials for the production of electricity 
usually requires factory-sized incinerators in fixed, permanent buildings or burning 
refined fossil fuels in portable generators. Establishing permanent infrastructure is neither 
compatible with the mission of military operations nor economically feasible with the 
relatively short duration of most military operations. Traditional portable generators 
require the availability of specific petroleum products such as gasoline or diesel fuel, 
which must be transported and stored according to strict conditions. 
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3. Prototype Development of a Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Generator 
For the past three years, research and development has been conducted on a 
tactical garbage-to-energy refinery (TGER). During development of this project, the REF 
worked with Purdue University, Defense Life Sciences LLC (DLSci), the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and other defense organizations to 
produce a working prototype (Wagner, 2007). Significant acquisition milestones 
achieved are: 
August 13, 2004 – Army Contract Award: DLSci is awarded a contract for Army 
Phase I Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) “Tactical Bio-refinery for Forward 
Fuel Production.” DLSci and its partners conduct feasibility analysis and prepare for 
phase II prototyping of a tactical garbage-to-energy refinery. 
December 15, 2004 – Army Contract Award: DLSci is awarded a Phase I Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) for “Tactical Bio-refinery” with U.S. Army Tank-
automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). Research and development (R&D) in 
this contract will be complementary to its current efforts with the Army STTR “Tactical 
Bio-refineries for Forward Fuel Production.” 
September 29, 2005 – Phase II STTR Contract Award: DLSci awarded STTR 
Phase II contract for prototype development of “Tactical Bio-refinery for Forward Fuel 
Production.” DLSci and its team-members will complete their prototype effort within 15 
months and conduct testing and evaluation at Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 
(ECBC). 
November 2006 – Successful test of first prototype TGER performed. 
December 31, 2006 – TGER Prototype Delivered: DLSci delivers the first 
prototype Tactical garbage-to-energy refinery to the Army (www.dlsci.com/ 
news_include.html, 2007). 
April 2007 – Project Initiation of TGER prototype # 2. 
A schedule of near-term developments and milestones includes: 
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Expected Delivery of both TGERs  December 2007 
Testing at ECBC    January-March 15, 2008 
Safety Confirmation/Release   March 2008 
System in Theater    July 15, 2008 
Assessment     December 15, 2008 
 
a. Project Cost 
Compared to major acquisition programs, the TGER program is relatively 
inexpensive. The costs and impacts of the TGER program are dependent on current and 
future efforts to reduce the physical size of each TGER and the results of system field 
tests. Current estimates of developing, upgrading, testing, and evaluating two TGER  
units are: 
Development of the TGER 
Option A: TGER #2    $1.3M 
Option B: TGER #2 plus upgrade TGER #1 $0.2M (net $1.5M) 
ECBC Program/Engineering Support  $0.3M 
Assessment Support (6 months)  $0.4M 
Total      $2.2M 
Option B considers development of TGER #1 as a sunk cost and shows 
only a marginal cost of upgrading to TGER #2 standards. Learning curve considerations 
have reduced the total cost of each current standard TGER from $1.5 million to  
$1.3 million. Future learning curve savings are as yet undetermined (Nolan, 2007). 
b. Project Performance 
The tactical garbage-to-energy refinery is actually three technologies in 
one: a bioreactor that uses enzymes and microorganisms to turn food waste into ethanol; 
a gasification unit that turns plastics, paper, and other residual waste into methane and 
low-grade propane; and a modified diesel engine that can burn gas, ethanol, and diesel 
fuel in variable proportions (Hamilton, 2007). The TGER operation is summarized in the 
following four steps: 
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1. The shredder rips up waste and soaks it in water. 
2. The sludge is pumped into the bioreactor, and enzymes break it down into 
carbohydrates and then into simple sugars, which yeast metabolizes into 
ethanol. 
3. The pelletizer compresses undigested waste pellets and feeds them into a 
gasification reactor that burns them in a low-oxygen, high-temperature 
environment to produce a composite gas. 
4. The ethanol is combined with the composite gas and injected into a diesel 
generator, where it’s mixed with two percent diesel fuel to generate 
electricity (Behar, 2007).  
Figure 8 is a diagram of the major parts of the TGER. 
 
 
Figure 8. Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery Diagram [From Behar, 2007] 
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In November 2006, researchers at Purdue University tested the first TGER 
prototype and found that it produced approximately 90 percent more energy than it 
consumed, said Jerry Warner, founder of DLSci, a private company working with Purdue 
researchers on the project. He said the results were better than expected.  In addition to 
providing an alternative energy source, TGER provided a 30-to-1 reduction in waste 
volume (Main, 2007). 
“We were lucky,” says Michael Ladisch, lead Purdue researcher on the 
project, pointing out complex mathematical modeling that was required to ensure that all 
parts hummed in harmony. “We turned the key and it actually started up. That’s never 
happened in my career before” (Hamilton, 2007). 
The plan is to shrink the system by 60 percent, making it small enough to 
fit on a Humvee trailer. Currently, a military 5-ton truck is required to transport the  
bio-refinery (Hamilton, 2007). 
Based on tests performed on December 31, 2006, the TGER’s 
performance exceeds required standards with less than ten percent parasitic energy to the 
system (www.dlsci.com/news_include.html, 2007). The United States Army 
subsequently commissioned the bio-refinery upon completion of the functional prototype, 
and the machine is being evaluated for future Army development (Main, 2007). 
4. Financial Incentives of Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Generators 
Transportation of fuel to remote operating bases in hostile areas via combinations 
of cargo ships, aircraft sorties, and truck convoys increases the financial cost of the 
delivered fuel as well as the vulnerability of the escorting troops to attack by hostile 
forces. Food, and other necessities of combat operations, must also be delivered through 
the supply chain to troops in the field. The waste generated from food and packaging 
materials at forward bases can be used as a fuel source to offset traditional means of 
powering electrical generators. 
The majority of savings from energy-conserving devices are not the result of 
direct fuel offsets, but rather a result of reduced requirements placed on the entire supply 
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system. Estimates of the true savings of the entire supply chain to deliver fuel to forward 
operating bases vary widely. Cost savings benefits as a result of the use of tactical bio-
refineries are dependent on who is realizing those savings. 
Consideration of the total cost of fuel delivery to remote operating bases increases 
the cost of each gallon of fuel considerably. Based on an estimate of 115 gallons of direct 
fuel offset by a TGER device at the FY2007 JP-8 fuel price, DESC would calculate the 
device to save $246.10 per day in fuel costs (115 gallons @ $2.14/gallon). The Army, 
however, would save transportation costs in excess of direct fuel savings. Previous 
studies have attempted to quantify the total cost of delivered fuel yielding per gallon 
estimates ranging from $4.40 to $20. The differences in total cost vary according to the 
inclusion of cost elements. Chapter V of this research provides greater detail of previous 
total fuel cost studies and payback calculations. 
5. The Role of Department of Defense Resource Allocation and 
Accounting Processes in Rewarding Fuel Efficiency or Penalizing 
Inefficiency 
Among the business world, the purpose of financial reporting is to reflect the 
priorities and policies of leadership and to ensure that there is tight coupling between 
investments and returns. However, in DoD there is weak and inaccurate linkage between 
allocation of resources and mission outcome, despite some prior efforts to make such a 
linkage. Interest in fuel and energy efficiency is largely limited to meeting federal 
executive orders or legislative mandates. However, since federal mandates do not apply 
to military weapons systems, there is neither a policy focus nor resource incentives to 
seek operational fuel efficiencies. Management attention, focus, and interest in fuel 
efficiency will result from documented analyses that quantify the military services’ 
operational, logistics, and environmental costs of fuel use, and savings from efficiency 
investments. 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE), DoD’s 
budget allocation system, contains no incentive to significantly improve platform fuel 
efficiency. A lack of analytical tools to quantify warfighting benefits understates the 
contribution to capability, and Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) for platforms and 
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systems do not explicitly require efficiency. The subsidized fuel pricing distorts the 
economic picture by understating economic benefits. The consequences of no efficiency 
requirement and a subsidized price are that investments to improve efficiency do not 
compete well (or at all) in the PPBE process. The result is increased costs and degraded 
war-fighting capability. 
Other disincentives to energy efficiency include comptroller practices that 
penalize commanders who reduce energy costs by reducing their budgets by the amount 
of savings. Funding to make platforms more efficient requires acquisition program or 
maintenance funding, but the impacts of these investments are the O&M accounts. In the 
business world this is called a “split incentive.” While DoD has made progress in 
factoring support costs into acquisition decisions, the analysis used to determine the 
appropriate level of investment is hampered by the artificially low fuel price and the 
inability to quantify the contribution to operational capability beyond the single platform 
level (USD (AT&L), Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, 2001). 
What financial structure is currently in place to provide fuel to fighting forces? 
Most DoD fuel is purchased centrally through the DESC, a subcommand of DLA, via the 
Working Capital Fund, Defense-Wide. The DESC buys fuel in bulk and charges its 
customers—mainly the Services—a stabilized rate for that fuel. The rates are set at the 
time of the budget, over one year in advance of when the Services purchase the fuel for 
consumption. 
The market price for fuel can fluctuate greatly between when the rates are set and 
when the fuel is actually moved and used. The Services buy fuel from DESC with O&M 
funds. If the actual cost of fuel is less than the stabilized rate, the DESC receives more 
money than the fuel actually costs, and future rates are adjusted to reflect the change. 
This rate structure simplifies accounting by allowing for minor fluctuations in actual 
pricing. 
The problem arises when the cost of fuel greatly exceeds the stabilized rate. The 
rates are adjusted to reflect the change, and the services have insufficient O&M funds to 
fuel their vehicles and perform other functions that are paid from that budget. DoD must 
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delay other efforts, normally maintenance and training activities, in order to pay its utility 
bills, including those necessary to fuel its weapon systems. These delayed functions are 
lost opportunities (USD (AT&L), More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel 
Burden, 2001). 
Congress provides supplemental funds when the cost of fuel far outstrips the 
stabilized rates that the Services use in their budget estimates. For example, the FY2006 
Emergency Supplemental Act appropriated an additional amount for the Defense 
Working Capital Fund (DWCF), of $516.7 million. This funds $37.6 million of increased 
fuel costs incurred by the DWCF business area fuel consumers as a result of increased 
fuel prices. Costs of $107 million associated with the delivery of fuel by truck to Iraq 
from Kuwait and Turkey and $25 million in costs associated with the operation of the 
theater consolidation shipping point in Kuwait are also funded in this proposal. In 
addition to the $37.6 million requested here, additional funding is requested in the 
Service accounts to support costs associated with increased fuel prices not covered by the 
$2.2 billion appropriation provided in Title IX of the FY2006 Defense Appropriations 
Act and for costs associated with additional quantities of fuel required for the Global War 
on Terror (OMB, 2006). 
These more realistic fuel cost projections, identifying the real cost of fuel to the 
operating forces and using that information to buy the optimum level of fuel efficiency 
can all help DoD maintain its training, weapons, and facilities maintenance. This cost 
accuracy improves overall readiness (USD (AT&L), More Capable Warfighting Through 
Reduced Fuel Burden, 2001). 
6. Why Deployed Forces Should Become More Fuel Efficient 
Although significant warfighting, logistics, and cost benefits occur when weapons 
systems are made more fuel efficient, these benefits can be subordinated to DoD 
requirements and acquisition processes. The war in Iraq has complicated Army and 
Marine Corps efforts to save fuel because the Services have added extra armor to their 
vehicles. Humvees with the latest armor are heavier and thus burn more fuel than those  
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without armor. The Army is also trading in hundreds of Humvees for larger and heavier 
M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicles, four-wheeled armored vehicles that burn 
more fuel (Komarow, 2006). 
Military requirements documents understandably place the highest priority on 
performance. Focusing on this singular demand often carries a substantial provisioning 
and maintenance penalty. While recent DoD policy guidance has placed heavy emphasis 
on improved reliability, it has overlooked the substantial performance gains that can also 
be achieved through energy efficiencies. These include greater range, lighter-weight 
systems, and reduced combat vulnerability. 
a. Fuel Efficiency in Warfighting System Acquisitions 
When asked to describe the capability improvements that would result 
from better efficiency, laboratories largely focus on an individual platform, but are unable 
to address the broader question of how it affects the capability of the entire force. The 
ability to conduct these critical analyses is limited by lack of modern analytical models to 
quantify the efficiency benefits in terms of: 
• numbers of systems needed to execute a mission 
• deployment times  
• sustainability for a given logistics capability 
• vulnerability of the logistics tail 
Energy and fuel efficiency would become a major variable in making final 
weapons system performance decisions if specified as a clear requirement (such as a key 
performance parameter) in all platforms (USD (AT&L), Improving Fuel Efficiency of 
Weapons Platforms, 2001). A new program to use the fully burdened cost of fuel in life 
cycle cost estimates and acquisition decision making is affecting the Army, Navy, and 




• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 
• Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces alternative ship 
concepts 
• Long-range strike concept decision 
The program applies business process principals to quantify DoD’s fully 
burdened cost of fuel and how to incorporate results into investment decisions. An 
integrated product team has been established to develop the policies and principles 
needed to institutionalize policy. Oversight for this pilot program is provided by the 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) (DiPetto, 2006). 
b. Fuel Efficiency Applicability to the Principles of War 
Improved warfighting capability can be directly linked to improved 
adherence to the following Principles of War: 
• Surprise: Fuel efficiency increases platform stealth by diminishing the 
platform’s heat signatures, exhaust, and/or wakes; and affords less chance 
of compromising movement by reducing the logistics tail and resupply 
communications. 
• Mass: Fuel efficiency decreases the time required to assemble an 
overwhelming force by increasing the percentage of airlift, trucking, and 
shipping logistics that can be dedicated to troops, vehicles, and supplies 
instead of fuel. This creates more operational bang for the same logistical 
buck. 
• Efficiency: Fuel efficiency increases commanders’ flexibility in 
efficiently assembling an overwhelming force by reducing the percentage 
of logistical assets dedicated to transporting fuel. This creates the same 
operational bang for less logistical bucks. 
• Maneuver: Platforms will travel faster and farther with reduced weight 
and smaller logistics tails that improve platform agility, loiter, and 
flexibility. Additionally, fuel previously consumed by electrical generators 
could be used for higher priority security and patrol vehicles. 
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• Security: Fuel efficiency decreases platform vulnerability to attacks on 
supply lines, and reduces demand for strategic reserves. 
• Simplicity: Fuel efficiency decreases the complexity and frequency of 
refueling operations and logistics planning, while reducing vulnerability to 
the “fog of war” (USD (AT&L), More Capable Warfighting Through 
Reduced Fuel Burden, 2001). 
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III. OPTIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
A. STATUS QUO 
When considering options for changing energy efficient investments, one is to 
continue with business as usual. Current options include not making installation 
infrastructure investments, requiring direct appropriation funding for energy efficient 
projects, and wholesale fuel pricing assumptions in weapon system O&M costing. 
Mandates to quantifiably increase energy efficiency may either preclude the status quo as 
an option or cause penalties for noncompliance. Status quo is used as a baseline in 
measuring the marginal return of many energy efficiency projects. 
B. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: CONTINUED USE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY MECHANISMS 
Already established in the processes directed by the chief White House 
environmental adviser, DoD is engaging energy efficiency on all fronts. The Pentagon’s 
proposed 2008 budget includes $55 billion of installation support, including O&M, 
environmental projects, and child care programs. Only about $60 million of that funding 
is directed at energy-efficiency projects. Instead of relying on those direct appropriations, 
the department has been averaging about $600 million a year in share-in-savings ESPCs. 
In addition to reducing demand for energy, DoD currently gets 13 percent of its 
electricity from renewable sources, surpassing its Congressionally-set goal of 7.5 percent. 
Get Moy, the Pentagon’s Director of Installations, Requirements, and Management, has 
established an informal goal of reaching 25 percent renewable energy by 2025 
(Kauffman, 2007). 
Within DON, 18 Super ESPC contracts were awarded or modified between 
FY1999 and FY2007 for a total investment of $154.5 million, total contract prices of 
$370 million, and total guaranteed cost savings of $364 million. These contracts are 
estimated to have a cumulative energy savings of over 13 trillion Btu’s 
(www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007). 
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1. Determining the Proper Return Metric-Payback versus Return on 
Investment 
The most popular metric for measuring the success of an energy-saving project is 
payback. Payback is the time it takes to recoup the cost of the energy saving measures 
through reduced energy expenses. The most basic formula for determining simple 
payback is to divide the initial investment amount by annual energy savings. Several 
energy-saving measures have imprecise rules of thumbs for determining payback based 
on historical trends; controls have a two-year payback, lighting has a four-year payback, 
etc. (Hansen, 2003). According to DoD instructions, any energy-saving project that has a 
simple payback of ten years or less should be implemented (USD (AT&L), 2005). 
Savings calculations based on payback alone provide a limited perspective on the 
full economic effects of energy conservation efforts. If energy conservation measures 
interfere with productivity, the resulting loss of revenue could be greater than the energy 
savings realized. For example, energy savings could easily be achieved by installing an 
underpowered winter heating system or by keeping office spaces dimly lit, but the 
resultant absenteeism and loss of productivity could overwhelmingly negate any energy 
savings. The energy payback of this project may initially be attractive, but when the 
impact it has on other aspects of the facility are considered, the project clearly has a 
negative return on investment. Owners do not buy “energy,” they buy what it can do for 
them. To save energy effectively, it is essential to look at energy as a component of the 
total operation. 
While the payback calculation is simple, it ignores many factors that could have a 
serious impact on the financial outcome of a project. Discounting for cost of capital, 
differences between inflation indices, and risk assessments are not addressed in the 
simple payback calculation, but are present in a thorough return on investment analysis. 
Simple payback is the time in an investment at which the undiscounted net present value 
is zero. The amount of time by which an investment’s term extends beyond a project’s 
payback is proportional to the ROI that project will yield. Once the initial investment is 
paid off, savings dividends increase the cumulative ROI of the project. Additionally, 
most financial lenders consider investments in terms of ROI, not payback. 
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 Life-cycle costing (LCC) presents the net benefits of all major costs and savings 
for the life of the equipment discounted to present value. An energy efficiency measure 
that lowers the LCC without loss in performance can generally be held to be more cost 
effective than a cheap, poor quality alternative or a measure with a low initial cost and 
higher operating costs. 
DoD instructions require that facilities utilize life-cycle cost analysis in making 
decisions about their investment in products, services, construction, and other projects to 
lower the federal government’s costs and to reduce energy consumption. The DoD 
components must consider the life-cycle costs of combining projects, and encourage 
aggregating of energy efficient projects with renewable energy projects (USD (AT&L), 
2005). 
2. Additional Requirements of Energy Management Programs 
Energy audits seek to determine the potential for energy savings through 
investment in energy efficiency. They help to identify areas for savings, mitigate 
uncertainty risk, and provide useful research into cost-effective efficiency measures. The 
requirement to make government installations more energy efficient requires the 
continued use of energy audits. However, energy audits are only one portion of a good 
energy management program. Several other factors play key roles in reducing energy 
consumption such as preventive maintenance, equipment calibrations, energy policy, 
procedures, training and control devices (Bubshait, 2003). 
C. MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES: USE OF WASTE-TO-
ENERGY GENERATORS 
An Army soldier produces an average of 7.2 pounds of trash per day. A typical 
700-person Army field battalion can produce over 2.5 tons of trash a day. Self-contained, 
self-powered, and about the size of a small moving van, a portable refinery that 
efficiently converts food, paper, and plastic trash into electricity may soon be joining 
troops at forward operating bases in Iraq or Afghanistan (Behar, 2007; Main, 2007). 
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1. Possible Benefits of a Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Refinery 
a. Reduced External Fuel Need 
Each day, the electrical energy produced by the generator from  
2,500 pounds of field waste reduces the electricity-producing fuel requirement by  
115 gallons of diesel fuel. Additionally, excess thermal energy from the bio-refinery can 
be used for field sanitation, showers, or laundry use (Nolan, 2007). 
b. Reduced Fuel Transport Costs in Money and Lives 
Each month, a TGER will directly save enough gasoline to fill a mid-sized 
tanker truck. Less fuel trucks means less convoys and reduced exposure time to convoy 
operations. While a decreased fuel demand does not directly equate to fewer personnel 
casualties, reducing the number of fuel convoys is an objective of the Commanding 
General, Multi-National Force-West’s request for a renewable energy source (CG,  
MNF-W, 2006). 
c. Reduction of Fossil Fuel Exhaust Released into the Atmosphere 
Much of the fuel the system combusts is carbon-neutral, said  
Nathan Mosier, a Purdue professor of agricultural and biological engineering involved in 
the project. Carbon-neutral fuels like ethanol do not cause an appreciable net increase in 
the atmosphere levels of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. This is because the fuel 
releases carbon that has only recently been taken up by plants during photosynthesis, the 
process by which plants convert carbon dioxide to oxygen and sugars. The same is not 
true for petroleum, in which the carbon contents were removed from the atmosphere 
millions of years ago (Main, 2007). 
d. Increased Energy Self-sufficiency in Case of Disruption in Fuel 
Supply 
The TGER provides enough energy to power a dining facility for a  
600-person Army field unit using almost entirely the waste produced from that same unit 
as fuel. Such self-sustaining use of resources frees up traditional fuel supplies for other 
military operations (Behar, 2007). 
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e. Reduced Waste 
In addition to providing a fuel source, the TGER provides a “twofer” by 
solving another problem of deployed units, reducing the logistics and costs of waste 
disposal (Behar, 2007). 
f. Reduced Volume Resulting in Reduced Waste Disposal Cost 
The TGER machine produces a very small amount of its own waste, 
mostly in the form of ash that the Environmental Protection Agency has designated as 
“benign,” or nonhazardous. Any leftover materials from the bioreactor are put into the 
gasifier, which has to be emptied every two to three days. The remaining waste is about 
enough to fill a regular-sized trash bag, and it represents about a 30-to-1 volume 
reduction (Main, 2007). 
g. Reduced Military “Waste Signature” 
By eliminating garbage remnants, the TGER could protect the unit’s 
security by destroying clues that such refuse could provide to the enemy (Main, 2007). 
h. Compatibility with Current Equipment 
The TGER was designed to be compatible with current transportation 
equipment and incorporates commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components. The TGER is 
skid mounted and can be employed on a military 5-ton flatbed trailer (Nolan, 2007). The 
generator set is the civilian version of 60KW “tactical” quiet generator, so parts, 
maintenance, and references are comparable (Nolan, 2007). With the exception of field 
trash and a trickle of diesel fuel, only one additional supply item is required. A 1.4-pound 
packet of biocatalyst containing enzymes and yeast is poured into the trash hopper each 
day. This packet is similar in appearance to laundry detergent (Nolan, 2007). 
i. Model for Civilian Use Elsewhere 
The TGER offers several applications outside military field use. A similar 
bio-refinery could be used in disaster areas. Areas affected by hurricanes, floods, or 
winter storms that are suffering loss of electrical and/or fuel distribution could use the 
  42
TGER to provide emergency power for rescue, health and welfare operations. TGERs 
could provide waste-to-energy conversion in traditional buildings as both supplemental 
and emergency power (Hamilton, 2007). 
2. Possible Financial Savings of Utilizing Waste-to-Energy Generators 
The TGER is not simply a generator that runs on bio-fuels that would have to be 
transported like traditional fossil fuels. The reduction of trash disposal costs offers 
additional financial incentives for such technologies (Behar, 2007). 
While only a single prototype has been developed, current estimates suggest that 
the machines may cost around $1.3 million dollars each, with multiple production 
efficiencies as of yet undetermined. The payback periods for such machines range from a 
few months to several decades, depending on the way they are used and the tradeoffs they 
allow (Main, 2007). A possible cost learning curve chart is included in Chapter V. 
Based on direct fuel costs alone, the project could have a payback period of up to 
31 years. However, the best locations for the deployment of TGERs are remote areas with 
little established infrastructure, where military operations are of a temporary nature. One 
of the primary themes of a 1998 Logistics Transformation Study was that “deployment 
and sustainment methods and equipment must change. Ability to deploy in undeveloped 
areas and under unfavorable conditions must improve” (USD (AT&L), 2001). 
These areas would have higher fuel transportation costs due to nonestablished or 
unfamiliar supply routes and few incentives to invest in long term capabilities. If total 
savings of the entire logistics systems are considered, each machine could pay for itself 
within months. Comparing per unit costs between domestic-grid derived and remote-area 
generated electricity is as disproportionate as comparing DESC standard fuel prices to 
end-to-end fuel prices. Payback analyses are included in Chapter V. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT 
The return on investment in energy efficiency projects contains both quantitative 
and qualitative measures. This research performs the quantitative return calculations of 
domestic and deployed installations. The conclusions chapter contains quantitative and 
qualitative return comparisons. The following two sections explain the basic 
methodology used in determining the quantitative return on each investment. Figure 9 
summarizes the methodology used in determining the return on investment for both 
domestic and deployed installations. 
 
Figure 9. Return on Investment Methodology Flowchart 
 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATIONS: PROJECT SAVINGS 
The methodology employed in the calculation of savings returns at domestic 
installations includes: 
• Data collection of government “super” energy saving performance 
contract investment amounts, contract prices, and guaranteed savings. 
• Normalization of collected data to account for inflation. All dollar 
amounts are converted to FY2007 equivalents. 
• Calculation of contract net present values. 
• Calculation of return on investment for capital source and government. 
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B. MILITARY FORWARD OPERATING BASES: TGER SAVINGS 
The methodology employed in the calculation of savings returns at deployed 
installations includes: 
• Data collection of fully burdened cost of fuel supplies and waste disposal 
estimates from three previous studies. 
• Normalization of collected data to account for inflation. All dollar 
amounts are converted to FY2007 equivalents. 
• Net present value calculation of comparative life-cycle cost estimate 
savings. 
• Calculation of system-wide return on investment. 
C. ASSUMPTION OF COST VARIABILITY 
One major assumption of this research is that all relevant costs of fuel delivery 
and waste disposal are eventually variable. While some costs may be fixed or sunk in the 
short term, it is assumed that if significant system-wide savings are possible over time, 
the variability of costs could increase to take advantage of long-term savings. Over time, 
equipment can be replaced, contracts can be renegotiated, and logistics procedures can be 
modified. It is also assumed that no economy of scale savings will be lost as a result of 
reduced energy consumption. 
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V. DATA AND COST ESTIMATES 
A. ESPC SAVINGS 
Between FY1998 and FY2007, 179 Super-ESPCs were issued for a total 
investment of $1.09 billion in government agency installation improvements. The 
combined guaranteed savings of these contracts is $2.68 billion, with total contract prices 
of $2.65 billion. All dollar amounts have been normalized to FY2007 equivalents. This 
section presents analysis of the financial returns of these energy performance savings 
contracts. Relationships between project investment, guaranteed cost savings, and 
contract price are quantified. Finally, contractor and government returns are compared. 
The premise for using ESPCs is to provide funds that would otherwise not be 
available for installation energy efficiency infrastructure improvements. Private equity 
sources provide these funds and are compensated via utility cost savings. The extent to 
which these arrangements are beneficial to government agencies or the private equity 
sources is affected by the structure of the contract. Inflation adjusted project investment, 
guaranteed savings, and contract price data provide a means of determining these 
financial benefits. 
Data were collected from government Super ESPCs between FY1998 and 
FY2007 (www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007). A scatter plot and regression of project 
investment versus guaranteed cost savings yields a predicted guaranteed cost savings 
estimate relative to project investment of: 
$23.69M+2.23*Project Investment (FY2007$M) 
This estimate is statistically significant and has a 95 percent goodness of fit with 
96 percent of the variation in guaranteed cost savings explained by project investment 
movement. This relationship suggests that for every dollar invested in chosen energy 
efficiency projects, 2.23 dollars in energy utility costs are saved. Figure 10 presents these 
findings graphically. This data suggests that investing in energy efficiency has the 
potential for positive financial returns over the life of the investment. 
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Project Investment vs. Guaranteed Cost Savings











































Figure 10. Super ESPC Project Investment versus Guaranteed Savings 
Given the analysis above that shows that there are potential savings, there are 
three options available for government agency energy efficiency projects: 
• Status quo – make no infrastructure improvements and yield no utility 
savings relative to current usage. 
• Self-invest – pay for infrastructure improvements via direct appropriation, 
government agency reaps utility savings over several years. 
• Energy savings performance contracts/contracting (ESPCs) – private 
equity funds improvements, utility savings compensate private equity 
funding according to contract terms. 
Each funding option is used frequently according to energy savings potentials and 
available funding. Energy intensity mandates create a demand to improve energy 
efficiency and may preclude the status quo as an option. Given the need for energy 
efficient projects and lean appropriation budgets, public funding for installation  
self-investment may not be available. The remaining option is ESPC. 
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ESPCs have pros and cons. On the positive side, they provide additional funds for 
installation improvements that would not otherwise be available. Additionally, 
guaranteed savings are structured so as to make the government better off with the 
contract than without it, as well as transferring some risk of future utility rate increases to 
the lender. The government’s financial benefit of the Super ESPCs can be quantified by 
looking at past examples. For all government super ESPCs issued from 1998 to 2007, the 
government is contracted to save a total of $27 million with the contracts relative to 
status quo through the term of the contracts. However, during this same period, lenders 
will receive the bulk of the utility savings. Of the forecasted $2.68 billion in utility 
savings, $1.09 billion will repay initial project investments, leaving $1.59 billion 
transferred to the private equity lenders as net income. While the government benefits 
from this arrangement via reduced energy usage relative to status quo and assistance in 
complying with EO 13423, vendors have significant financial incentives. Returns on 
investment for equity lenders range from 116 to 224 percent over the life of the contract. 
If the government chose to fund the projects and was able to reproduce the program 
management and other behaviors of these commercial vendors, it may have realized a 
$1.59 billion savings after repaying all project investment costs. Table 4 displays 
government and contractor savings and ROI data for all government Super-ESPCs from 
1998 to 2007 (www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007). 
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Total for FY 1998 9 20 23 11 127% 3 14 160% 
Total for FY 1999 53 123 125 70 131% 1 71 133% 
Total for FY 2000 80 174 175 94 119% 1 96 120% 
Total for FY 2001 147 335 330 188 128% -4 183 125% 
Total for FY 2002 115 373 373 257 224% 1 258 224% 
Total for FY 2003 294 635 647 341 116% 12 352 120% 
Total for FY 2004 25 59 62 34 134% 3 37 146% 
Total for FY 2005 79 217 217 138 175% 0 138 176% 
Total for FY 2006 169 425 430 256 151% 5 261 155% 
Total for FY 2007 122 291 296 169 138% 4 173 142% 
Total all years 1,093 2,651 2,678 1,558 143% 27 1,585 145% 
Project Investment:  Amount invested in facility improvements     
Contract Price:  Contract cost to government      
Guaranteed Cost Savings: Reduction in energy/utility costs over length of contract   
Contractor Net:  Difference between contract price and project investment   
Contractor ROI:  Contractor return on investment (contractor net divided by project investment)  
Govt net (w/contract): Guaranteed cost savings less contract price    
Govt net (self invest); Guaranteed cost savings less project investment    
Govt (self invest) ROI: Govt net (self invest) divided by project investment    
  
Table 4.   All Government Super ESPC Data FY1998-FY2007  
[After: www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007] 
 
B. TOTAL DELIVERED FUEL DATA FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Recent studies have sought to quantify the total cost of fuel delivered to military 
forward operating bases. Three studies that this research references are: 
• Burdened Cost of Fuel, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program 
Analysis and Evaluation), August 2006. 
• An Analysis of the Energy Potential of Waste in the Field, Logistics 
Management Institute, February 2004. 
• Sustain the Mission Project: Resource Costing and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Army Environmental Policy Institute, July 2006. 
1. Summary of Burdened Fuel and Waste Cost Estimates 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the referenced studies. The LMI study makes a 
cost distinction between the brigade- and battalion-level costs, while the other two studies 
do not specifically detail how such costs may vary. Selection of comparatively 
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appropriate models has attempted to enable sufficient commonality for equating 
battalion-level costs. These figures are used as the basis for determining operations and 
maintenance life cycle cost estimates for a waste-to-energy generator. The standard fuel 
price of $2.14 per gallon is used as the unburdened cost of fuel and $69 per ton is 
considered the unburdened waste disposal cost. 
 
 Burdened Cost of Fuel Burdened Cost of Waste Disposal 
OSD(PA&E) Study $5.54/gal n/a 
LMI Study $20/gal $975/ton 
SMP Model $6.40/gal n/a- 
Table 5.   Summary of Delivered Fuel and Waste Disposal Cost Estimates 
 
The following sections describe the basic methodologies of each study. The data 
from these studies are used as fully burdened fuel cost estimates in subsequent analyses. 
Since the studies occurred in different years, each estimate is first presented in then year 
dollars and then converted to FY2007 dollar estimates for comparability. 
2. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) 
(OSD (PA&E)): Burdened Cost of Fuel 
This OSD (PA&E) study (OSD study) estimates the costs of fuel delivery using 
the DESC standard price as a starting point and adds the costs incurred in retail fuel 
delivery such as: 
• Primary Fuel Delivery Asset O&S 
• Primary Fuel Delivery Asset Depreciation 
• Direct Ground Fuel Infrastructure O&S 
• Indirect Base infrastructure O&S 
• Nominal Environmental Cost 
• Other Service/Delivery Specific Costs 
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Figure 11. Military Burdened Fuel Cost by Service and Consumption  
[From OSD (PA&E), 2006] 
 
The OSD study examines delivered fuel costs of each military service as 
illustrated in Figure 11. The model of this research is based on TGER placement at an 
Army battalion and thus focuses on those portions of the study applicable to the Army. 
Based on the above cost elements and the determination that the primary fuel delivery 
method is via ground vehicles, the 2006 burdened cost of fuel for Army JP-8 is calculated 
as follows: 
• Standard Fuel Price Per Gallon   $2.53 
• O&S of Fuel Trucks/Trailers (including personnel) $3.13 
• Fuel Truck/Trailer Depreciation    $0.09 
• Base Infrastructure Costs    unknown 
• Environmental Costs      $0.10 
• Total Cost Per Gallon:    $5.85 
•  
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Converting the FY2006 estimate to an FY2007 estimate yields the following: 
• Standard Price per gallon (published 2007 price) $2.14 
• O&S of Fuel Trucks/Trailers (including personnel) $3.21 
• Fuel Truck/Trailer Depreciation   $0.09 
• Base Infrastructure Costs    unknown 
• Environmental Costs      $0.10 
• Total Cost Per Gallon:    $5.54 
This estimate of $5.54 per gallon represents FY2007 generic peacetime costs, 
which can increase according to mission and security escort requirements (OSD (PA&E), 
2006). 
3. Logistics Management Institute: An Analysis of the Energy Potential 
of Waste in the Field 
The LMI study estimates the amount and makeup of waste in an operating theater, 
analyzes the logistics of waste disposal and fuel supply there, and estimates the value of a 
process for converting waste into fuel. In characterizing military waste, the study 
gathered data at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. Estimates of 
typical waste streams for a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) over a continuous  
30-day period were developed based on actual waste streams of units conducting field 
condition exercises. The SBCT is the most modern fighting unit within the United States 
Army, so it provides an excellent source of data for the amounts and types of waste that 
future Army units are likely to produce. To assess waste disposal in the field, this study 
examined open literature and conducted interviews with field personnel. Although little 
hard data on field waste disposal exists, extensive anecdotal information suggests that 
such disposal sometimes can be troublesome for U.S. forces. 
The LMI study’s analysis of the logistics of waste disposal accounts for the 
personnel, trucks, fuel, and other equipment needed. It also considers how these logistics 
change as military units pick up and transport waste from different points in an operating 
theater. Finally, this study addresses logistics costs in order to estimate the value of 
reducing waste through transforming it into fuel. 
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In a 2001 report, the Defense Science Board (DSB) estimated the cost to transport 
fuel to and within an operating theater. The LMI study borrows those costs to estimate 
the value of fuel produced at different points within a theater. 
a. Cost of Waste Disposal 
Based on the LMI study of current and past waste disposal practices by 
deployed Army troops, estimates of potential savings from converting waste into fuel 
include the following: 
• The estimated costs of disposal in a Middle Eastern theater vary between 
$62 and $903 per ton, depending on how far the waste must be transported 
for disposal. 
• According to a Defense Science Board study, it costs DoD $13 per gallon 
to deliver fuel to an in-theater base support depot. From there, the costs 
rise with distance to any distribution point. 
In estimating the cost of waste disposal for a Middle Eastern operation at 
the corps, division, brigade, and battalion levels, the assumption is made that all the waste 
generated in the theater is picked up and disposed of behind the lines. Troops in the midst 
of a conflict often are forced to bury or burn waste on the spot, but after a conflict is 
resolved and troops remain in place, the waste is likely to be collected. 
Basic assumptions of this model are as follows: 
• Cost of truck—A standard U.S. Army M931, 6x6, 5-ton truck is capable 
of carrying 30.5 cubic yards (approximately 2.82 tons), while achieving 
4.1 mpg in open road driving. We assume that its average speed in trash 
transport duty is 30 mph. Such a truck costs about $128,000, and will 
travel approximately 68,000 miles over a 20-year lifetime, implying an 




• Cost of soldiers—The fully loaded average pay of two soldiers (one a 
private first class and the other a private/E-2) is $18.40 per hour. We 
assume the soldiers are on the truck during its entire trip and also spend 
one hour loading and unloading trash. 
• Cost of fuel—The cost of JP-8 is $13 per gallon at the point of entry. 
• Cost of waste disposal—The U.S. average cost multiplied by a local 
adjustment factor. 
• Waste per man per day—Estimated at 7.2 pounds using the Fort Irwin 
data. 
This last assumption allows for a calculation of the daily amounts of waste 
for each Army unit: 
• Battalion—2.5 tons 
• Brigade—12.6 tons 
• Division—50.4 tons 
• Corps—201.6 tons 
Since no data was available on the cost of disposing of waste in overseas 
locations, the chosen starting point is the average cost in the United States in 2003, 
$34.06 per ton. The Army Corps of Engineers has published a list of Local Adjustment 
Factors that provides relative costs of construction (compared to the United States) in 
many countries around the world. For this analysis, the assumption is made that relative 
trash disposal costs are similar to these relative construction costs. 
The Army Corps of Engineers provides adjustment factors for only two 
Middle Eastern countries: Oman and Bahrain. The factors for these countries are 1.58 and 
2.07, respectively. Using an average of the two, an adjustment factor for the Middle East 
would be 1.825, which means that the cost of disposing of a ton of solid waste in a 
Middle East theater would be $62.16, which is rounded to $62 for simplicity. The 
distance between the division and corps support areas is 124 miles. Thus, trucks would 
travel 248 miles to pickup and deliver trash to that point. The cost of this operation would 
be as follows: 
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• Truck—248 miles at $1.88 per mile = $466 per trip to carry 2.82 tons 
• Soldiers—2 soldiers at $18.40 per hour times 9.27 hours = $341 
• Fuel—248 miles ÷ 4.1 mpg × $13 per gallon = $786 
• Disposal—$62 per ton 
Divide the first three numbers by 2.82 to derive a per ton cost, and then 
add $62, yielding a total cost of waste disposal generated at the division level of 
approximately $629 per ton. Continuing this cost allocation to the brigade and battalion 
levels yields corresponding cost increases as shown in Table 6. 
 
Cost Category Corps Division Brigade Battalion 
Truck - 166 199 248 
Soldiers - 121 143 170 
Fuel - 280 334 418 
Disposal 62 62 62 62 
Total 62 629 738 898 
 
Table 6.   Waste Disposal Costs in a Middle Eastern Operating Theater ($/ton) [From 
LMI, 2004] 
 
These estimates provide a basis for determining the value of transforming 
waste generated at various points along the supply chain into fuel. Simple reasoning 
implies that a ton of waste transformed into fuel is a ton of waste not subjected to 
transport and disposition. 
Assuming the 2004 waste disposal costs are in 2004 dollar amounts, the 
cost of battalion-level waste disposal in 2007 is approximately $975 per ton. 
b. Cost of Fuel Delivery 
The DSB study cites work done by the Army Research Laboratory, which 
calculated a typical cost for fuel delivered to an in-theater support depot of $13/gallon. 
The DSB provided an estimate of the cost of moving fuel from a support depot toward 
the front lines. It found that moving fuel by heavy truck (5,000 gallons on a Heavy 
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Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMMT)) costs about $50 per kilometer. It also 
found that movement by helicopter is many times more expensive, as much as $400 per 
gallon for 1,500 gallons delivered 600 kilometers, for example. 
The LMI study assumes that fuel is moved by truck to various points 
along the supply chain. The Corps Support Area is assumed coincident with the initial 
supply depot, and other support areas are forward from there. Given the DSB estimate of 
$50 per kilometer, the 2004 estimated cost of delivered fuel would be as follows: 
• Corps—$13 per gallon 
• Division—$17 per gallon 
• Brigade—$18 per gallon 
• Battalion—$19 per gallon 
Adjusting for inflation from 2004 to 2007, the 2007 estimated costs of 
delivered fuel are: 
• Corps—$14 per gallon 
• Division—$18 per gallon 
• Brigade—$19 per gallon 
• Battalion—$20 per gallon 
These costs provide a means to estimate the value of fuel produced by a 
waste-to-energy process within a theater. It can be reasoned that a gallon of fuel produced 
on site is one less gallon that has to be brought to the theater and distributed there. 
4. Army Environmental Policy Institute Report “Sustain the Mission 
Project: Resource Costing and Cost-Benefit Analysis” 
The first step in development of the Sustain the Mission Project (SMP) costing 
model was to identify the key cost elements that come into play in the consumption of 
energy. The SMP fuel cost elements are comprised of four categories:  
• the fuel commodity 
• the materiel required for distribution, storage, and quality control of the 
commodity 
  56
• the logistical infrastructure, including port handling and intra- and inter-
theater transport costs, considered for both military deployment and 
contractor resupply scenarios 
• support services, or the military personnel tasked with supplying the 
commodity.  
These cost elements are summarized in Table 6. The SMP model does not 
consider force protection for delivery of the fuel, although these factors could certainly be 
included in future analyses, and some likely should. 
 
Figure 12 portrays the potential journeys fuel may undertake in contingency 
operations. Along each leg of the journey, different costs come into play that correspond 
with the cost elements identified above. There are two basic pathways for energy: one 
begins at the U.S. base of operations and covers the full distance to the point of use; the 
other begins in-theater at a prepositioned supply or local source, thus incurring fewer 
costs in transport. The SMP cost methodology considers these potential journeys in order 
to cost out the relevant cost elements according to varying scenarios. 
 
Figure 12. SMP Contingency Operation Fuel Journey [From AEPI, 2006] 
 
After identifying the cost elements, the next step was to define the actual items 
populating each cost element category. For this step, the SMP authors sought out Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) in the Army logistics, costing, force development, and installation 
communities. 
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The fuel commodity cost element is simply the gallon of Jet Propellant-8 
(standard kerosene jet fuel [JP-8]), diesel fuel, or gasoline that is purchased by the Army 
from DESC at the training base or at a Defense Fuel Supply Point (DFSP) in theater. For 
the SMP cost model, it was assumed that all fuel consumed consisted of JP-8, for 
simplicity. 
DESC was consulted for the supply scenario for fuel in contingency operations. 
The SMP cost methodology is based on the assumption that DESC maintains a DFSP 
both at the case study training base site, and in the case study theater. DESC absorbs all 
costs of delivering the fuel to the base or theater and the Army pays only the standard 
price set by DESC. This wholesale refinery price was used to cost out the fuel commodity 
cost element. 
The fuel support items cost element comprises the materiel required to distribute 
and store fuel as well as produce energy. Such support items include refueling equipment, 
pipeline construction equipment, filters, hoses, storage drums, tanker trucks, and pumps. 
Of equal importance are generator sets, which the Army depends on for mobile power 
generation in the field. This research does not consider TGER savings internal to the 
SMP model. 
The port handling cost element applies only to contingency operations. Port 
handling fees are calculated per measurement-ton, and differ according to the type of 
item being transported. Port handling is charged both at the point of embarkation (POE) 
and the point of debarkation (POD). 
The inter- and intra-theater transport cost element applies to contingency 
operations and includes the delivery of fuel from the DFSP to the point of use, and the 
delivery of fuel support items from the training base or prepositioned supply depot to the 
point of use. The SMP cost model is based on the assumption that the Army purchases 
fuel from the DESC at a given location, and then transports it by military vehicle to the 
stationing area. Fuel is then resupplied throughout the periods of deployment and 
redeployment in theater by either contract vehicle or, in case of rough terrain or tactical 
necessities, Chinook helicopter. In the SMP methodology, the fuel support items are 
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transported only once inter-theater during initial deployment, and are redeployed intra-
theater a varying number of times and distances. Cost of transport by sea is based on a 
flat rate per measurement ton figure; by military or contract truck is based on a dollar per 
short-ton per mile rate; and by Chinook is based on a dollar per short-ton per hour rate. 
The fuel support services cost element applies to contingency operations, and 
represents the military personnel whose primary responsibility is supplying fuel to the 
unit in the theater. The number of personnel tasked with fuel storage, distribution, and 
related activities were costed out according to their Continental U.S. (CONUS) basic pay 
and allowances plus Special, Incentive, and Hazardous Duty Pays. The SMP 
methodology does not include personnel costing in the analysis of the training base, but it 
is worth noting that future work might consider costing out the military occupational 
specialty (MOS) training activities that are associated with fuel support services. It 
should be noted that assigning costs to a personnel category is a dicey business, because 
of sunk costs and shared duties. For example, engineer battalions carry out construction 
of pipelines for fuel, but are primarily involved in activities not related to energy supply. 
Because of this issue, it was necessary for the current SMP methodology to narrow the 
personnel factor down to the smallest common denominator to avoid the inclusion of 
sunk costs. 
For the purposes of the SMP methodology demonstration, three scenarios were 
developed to demonstrate the range of costs that are possible when including the cost 
elements. These three scenarios represent the low cost, medium cost, and high cost 
estimates of fuel delivery. For simplicity in this research, the medium-cost scenario from 
the SMP model will be used for comparison purposes. The costs of this scenario are 
illustrated in Figure 13 and assume the following delivery characteristics: 
• Contractor resupply of fuel during established military operations 
• 150 miles roundtrip per delivery 
• 180 trips per year 
• 50 percent of fuel is delivered by truck 
• 50 percent is delivered by Chinook helicopter due to difficult terrain 
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Figure 13. Medium-cost Scenario Results for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s 
Energy Use in Contingency Operations [From AEPI, 2006] 
 
In converting the 2006 SMP study to 2007 dollars, the fuel commodity price is 
adjusted from $2 per gallon to $2.14 per gallon as per the published DESC standard fuel 
cost. All other costs are adjusted according to O&M indices. This conversion yields the 
following 2007 estimate: 
Fuel Commodity (2,390,161 gallons @ $2.14/gallon) $5,114,945 
All Other O&M costs (9,938,855*1.0250 inflation factor) $10,187,326 
Full Annual Ownership Cost     $15,302,271 
Burdened Cost per Gallon (based on 2,390,161 gallons) $6.40 
C. LIFE CYCLE COST COMPARISON OF A WASTE-TO-ENERGY 
GENERATOR VERSUS A STANDARD FIELD GENERATOR 
1. Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) Assumptions 
For purposes of this comparison, the performance of a TGER unit is considered to 
be an acceptable substitute for generator sets currently used in operating environments. 
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All elements of military generator requirements are assumed to be met. These qualities 
include ruggedness, ease of maintenance, reliability, transportability, series/parallel 
configuration, and power quality at extreme temperatures and altitudes. Additional 
assumptions of this model include: 
• “laundry packet” of bioreactor enzymes incurs a negligible cost 
• one TGER is capable of processing 2,500 pounds of convertible waste per 
day creating a direct fuel offset of 115 gallons 
• TGER prototype is able to be reproduced in a reasonable time 
2. Generator Life-Cycle Cost Estimates ( LCCE) 
LCCE of currently used generators and a prototype waste-to-energy generator 
illustrate the total production cost of each system. For this example, both generators will 
be assumed to be operated by an Army battalion deployed to a nonpermanent forward 
operating base in the Middle East. The following costs estimates are based on analogous 
systems and expert opinion. 
a. Initial Cost Comparison 
A standard 60-kilowatt field generator set (NSN 6115-01-317-2134) is 
currently available to field commanders at a price of $25,063 (Army Natick, 2007). The 
first prototype TGER had a cost of $1.5 million, not including $0.3 million of  
Army-funded program and engineering support or $0.4 million of assessment support. 
The second TGER has an expert opinion estimated production cost of $1.3 million (all 
dollar figures are FY2007$). If the same rate of learning occurs in subsequent units, an  
87 percent learning curve approximates expected production efficiencies. Figure 14 
represents a hypothetical production learning curve for the first ten TGER units. 
Assuming learning at this rate continues indefinitely, the purchase price of the standard 
generator set will be below TGER individual unit production costs until the 
699,725,122nd TGER is produced. At this production level, the average TGER unit cost 
will still exceed the standard 60-kilowatt generator price by $6,301. Such production  
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levels are several orders of magnitude above any realistic expectations for TGER 
production, but illustrate that the value of such a system will not be found in initial 
generator procurement cost savings. 























Figure 14. Theoretical TGER Production Learning Curve 
 
There is a possibility that TGER components external to the generator 
may have a life expectancy beyond that of the replaceable onboard generator set. While 
specific component life spans may provide for system extensions without the need for 
total system replacement, there is not yet enough known about specific components to 
warrant separate life-cycle estimates. Accordingly, the entire TGER system is assumed to 
have a uniform system-wide life expectancy. The possible increased life expectancy of 
those components is assumed to offset disposal costs in excess of a standard generator, 
thus, disposal costs are not included as a source of additional cost or savings. 
In presenting comparative cost estimates, two figures will be used to 
predict the initial cost of fielded TGERs. For the conservative estimate, per unit cost will 
be held constant at $1.3 million; however, much of the embedded cost of the first 
prototypes was used for research and development efforts and not purely manufacturing. 
Experts familiar with the system estimate that production models beyond the second 
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prototype could be produced for as little as $300,000 each. If the learning curve cost 
reduction model holds, the average unit price will reach $300,000 after the production of 
the 9,200th unit. Given the significant difference between initial cost estimates and the 
possibility of nonproduction costs in prototype development figures, LCCE and return 
calculations will consider both estimates separately. 
b. Operation and Maintenance Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCEs) 
Since cost avoidance and savings are not found in the initial procurement 
phase of a TGER life-cycle, estimates of O&M life-cycle costs must be examined. 
Additionally, a complete LCCE includes O&M costs. The following O&M cost estimates 
focus on the marginal cost differences between a traditionally fueled generator and a 
waste-to-energy generator. As mentioned in the overall assumptions, the maintenance 
requirements, reliability, and performance of each option are assumed to be equivalent. 
Cost elements that are common and assumed equivalent to each option are not included 
in the cost savings estimate. The cost elements included vary according to which study is 
referenced; all previous studies include a burdened cost of fuel, but only one also 
considers waste disposal. All dollar amounts are inflation normalized to FY2007 dollars. 
Life expectancy estimates of field generators vary significantly. Warranty 
coverage for a standard 60kW generator covers the lesser of 36 months or 1,800 
operating hours (Marine Corps Systems Command, 2006). If operated continuously, a 
generator could consume its warranty coverage within 75 days, although it is expected 
that a generator will perform well beyond its warranty period. Estimates for actual 
operating life range from 10,000 hours (1.14 years continuous) to ten years with proper 
maintenance. Given such a wide range of life expectancy, O&M life-cycle estimates from 
1 to 10 years are prepared with associated returns for each time period. Given the more 
costly initial procurement cost, O&M savings yield a greater return as life expectancy 
increases. Table 7 presents annual O&M life-cycle cost savings estimates for each 
burdened fuel/waste cost study, along with unburdened fuel savings. Figure 15 presents 
cumulative operating savings of each cost element. 
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Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Totals
LMI Model Fuel cost per gallon: 20 Waste disposal cost per ton: 975
Period O&M Savings 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 12,843
Fully Burdened Fuel Savings 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 840 8,395
Waste Disposal Savings 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 4,448
SMP Model Fuel cost per gallon: 6.40 Waste disposal cost per ton: 0
Period O&M Savings 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 2,686
Fully Burdened Fuel Savings 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 2,686
Waste Disposal Savings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OSD(PA&E) Model Fuel cost per gallon: 5.54 Waste disposal cost per ton: 0
Period O&M Savings 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 2,325
Fully Burdened Fuel Savings 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 2,325
Waste Disposal Savings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unburdened Fuel cost per gallon: 2.14 Waste disposal cost per ton: 0
Period O&M Savings 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 898
Fully Burdened Fuel Savings 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 898
Waste Disposal Savings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Savings figures in FY07$K, per unit costs in FY07$  
Table 7.   Annual TGER O&M Fuel and Waste Disposal Savings 
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c. Project Return on Investment 
Given initial cost data and expected O&M savings, the ROI for a specific 
generator life expectancy can be determined. In this case, investment and savings are 
measured relative to a standard generator set, so initial investment is calculated as the 
cost of a TGER in excess of a standard generator set. Return is measured by subtracting 1 
from the quotient of operating savings divided by investment [(operating 
savings/investment)-1]. Table 8 summarizes cumulative savings and returns based on a 
TGER initial cost of $1.3M. Table 9 provides the same information for TGER initial cost 
of $300K. Returns are overall and not annualized. Combinations of generator life 
expectancy and operating savings models that have a negative return are below the thick 
line. Based on ROI, any combination above the line has the potential for overall cost 
savings when compared to the status quo. 
 
All dollar figures in FY07K$
Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Investment (initial cost difference) 1,275
Cumulative LMI Operating Savings 1,284 2,569 3,853 5,137 6,422 7,706 8,990 10,275 11,559 12,843
LMI Model ROI 1% 101% 202% 303% 404% 504% 605% 706% 807% 907%
Cumulative SMP Operating Savings 269 537 806 1,075 1,343 1,612 1,880 2,149 2,418 2,686
SMP Model ROI -79% -58% -37% -16% 5% 26% 47% 69% 90% 111%
Cumulative OSD Operating Savings 233 465 698 930 1,163 1,395 1,628 1,860 2,093 2,325
OSD Model ROI -82% -64% -45% -27% -9% 9% 28% 46% 64% 82%
Cumulative Unburdened Operating Savings 90 180 269 359 449 539 629 719 808 898
Unburdened ROI -93% -86% -79% -72% -65% -58% -51% -44% -37% -30%  
Table 8.   Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $1.3) 
 
 
All dollar figures in FY07K$
Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Investment (initial cost difference) 275
Cumulative LMI Operating Savings 1,284 2,569 3,853 5,137 6,422 7,706 8,990 10,275 11,559 12,843
LMI Model ROI 367% 834% 1301% 1769% 2236% 2703% 3170% 3637% 4104% 4571%
Cumulative SMP Operating Savings 269 537 806 1,075 1,343 1,612 1,880 2,149 2,418 2,686
SMP Model ROI -2% 95% 193% 291% 389% 486% 584% 682% 779% 877%
Cumulative OSD Operating Savings 233 465 698 930 1,163 1,395 1,628 1,860 2,093 2,325
OSD Model ROI -15% 69% 154% 238% 323% 407% 492% 577% 661% 746%
Cumulative Unburdened Operating Savings 90 180 269 359 449 539 629 719 808 898
Unburdened ROI -67% -35% -2% 31% 63% 96% 129% 161% 194% 227%  
 
Table 9.   Cumulative Operating Savings and Comparative ROIs (TGER @ $300K) 
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3. TGER Payback Calculations 
Figure 16 illustrates the simple payback periods for a TGER device with a 
purchase price of $1.3 million. Based on unburdened waste disposal costs of $69 per ton 
and unburdened fuel costs of $2.14 per gallon, unburdened payback periods considering 
waste only, fuel only, and waste and fuel savings are 41, 14, and 11 years, respectively. 
Using the LMI study fully burdened cost estimates of $20 per fuel gallon and $975 per 
ton of waste, cost savings for each category yield payback periods of 2.9, 1.5 and 1 years. 
Figure 17 illustrates payback periods based on a $300,000 purchase price. These charts 
present the extremes of payback possibilities based on unburdened costs and the highest 
cited study. Paybacks based on OSD and SMP fuel burden cost models are between these 
extremes. While ROI provides a more detailed analysis of options, some DoD 
instructions cite payback as an investment decision metric. These figures are provided to 
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Figure 17. TGER Payback Periods ($300K initial cost) 
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VI. OBSERVATIONS 
A. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
“[Exxon has] placed a very large bet with shareholders’ money that the world will 
remain addicted to fossil fuels, and they’re not ready for a more carbon-constrained 
world,” according to Andrew Logan, a leading oil and gas analyst. Yet Americans are 
unhappy with record high gas prices, and the U.S. public has become very welcoming of 
alternative energies and energy-saving technologies in recent years.. (Herbst, 2007). 
Hybrid and “flex-fuel” vehicles are becoming popular not only because of 
consumers’ demand for them, but also because of automakers taking advantage of  
fuel-efficiency calculation loopholes. Automakers are able to account for potential use of 
alternative fuels, particularly ethanol, in “flex-fuel” vehicles, even if alternative fuels are 
not available in the area or if owners use traditional fossil fuels. Gasoline-electric hybrid 
vehicles are more generally more fuel efficient than gasoline-only models. 
The President’s 2007 budget request included $150 million for bio-mass and  
bio-refinery systems research and development, an increase of $59 million from the 2006 
level (Budget Function 270, 2007). Bio-refining technologies are becoming a reality in 
the United States and are receiving increasing funding from Congress. 
Keeping troops safe from attacks is a military objective. If these efforts are tied to 
support for bio-fuels and elimination of field waste, the case for development of such 
technologies is strengthened. One possible argument against burning trash versus 
traditional fossil fuels is a slight increase in NOX, which are believed to contribute to 
acid rain, ozone depletion, and aggravation of asthmatic conditions, among other 
problems (EPA, 1998). However, the high-temperature refining process can reduce these 
dangerous compounds to their elemental nitrogen and oxygen. The reduction in  
carbon-dioxide, particulate matter, and other pollutants, when compared to fossil fuels, 
makes bio-refineries a cleaner way to produce electricity. 
Trashing another country’s land with the garbage of an expeditionary army is not 
politically popular overseas. Spending American taxpayers’ money purchasing fuel from 
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foreign companies is not politically popular at home. Politically, tactical bio-refineries 
could provide “green” energy, keep our troops safer, provide our hosts with a cleaner 
American footprint, reduce fuel payments to foreign companies, and improve our 
responsiveness to natural disasters at home and abroad. Recent administrations have had 
troubles with all of those issues in the past. Tactical bio-refineries could be a step in the 
right direction politically. 
B. THE POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING STANDARD FUEL PRICES TO 
INCLUDE END-TO-END FUEL DELIVERY COSTS 
Adjusting the standard fuel price to cover all end-to-end costs has several 
problems. The standard fuel price is an average of fuels provided by DESC. These fuels 
are not provided in equal proportions. An increase in the standard fuel price would 
require increasing the price of individual fuels significantly or raising the cost of all fuels. 
The market economics of supply and demand might provide the intended results of 
meeting total costs by reducing demand, but may create inefficiencies and chokepoints in 
the logistics stream by disrupting expected fuel amounts and established patterns of use. 
Transportation costs of fuels vary according to customer and use. A Navy 
destroyer receiving fuel at the DESC, Bahrain station would have few transportation 
costs relative to an Army unit deployed deep inside Iraq or Afghanistan. If DESC fuel 
pricing included aggregate end-to-end costs, the Navy would, in effect, be providing a 
subsidy to the Army to cover its fuel transportation costs. While military “jointness” is 
encouraged in an operational environment, service parochialism still leads the way with 
regard to budgetary commingling. Setting separate fuel prices based on the customer, 
usage, distance to travel, and other cost variables is impractical and would be very 
difficult to accurately calculate or forecast (DESC, 2006). 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DOMESTIC INSTALLATION RESULTS: THE RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT (ROI) OF ENERGY SAVINGS PERFORMANCE 
CONTRACTS (ESPCs) 
Based on government Super-ESPC data from FY1998 to FY2007, investment in 
installation energy efficiency is projected to produce energy savings in excess of 
investment cost. Figure 18, a regression of utility savings versus project investment, 
suggests that for every dollar invested in project improvement, 2.23 dollars in utility costs 
are saved over the course of an ESPC project lifetime. According to data provided by the 
Department of Energy, of the $2.68 billion in forecasted energy savings, $2.65 billion is 
contracted to be transferred to private capital sources, with the remaining $27 million in 
savings provided to government agencies (difference due to rounding). The total invested 
by private equity for facility energy efficiency is $1.09 billion. Due to positive net present 
values, government agencies are financially better off with ESPCs than without them for 
projects that are not funded by direct appropriations. If the government could replicate 
the forecasted savings, availability of capital, and program management of private equity 
contracts, it could reduce its energy expenditures by a greater degree than with ESPCs. 
Table 10 provides returns on investment per year for private equity investments in 
government agency installation energy efficiency and potential government returns for 
self-investment in energy efficiency. 
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Total for FY 1998 9 20 23 11 127% 3 14 160% 
Total for FY 1999 53 123 125 70 131% 1 71 133% 
Total for FY 2000 80 174 175 94 119% 1 96 120% 
Total for FY 2001 147 335 330 188 128% -4 183 125% 
Total for FY 2002 115 373 373 257 224% 1 258 224% 
Total for FY 2003 294 635 647 341 116% 12 352 120% 
Total for FY 2004 25 59 62 34 134% 3 37 146% 
Total for FY 2005 79 217 217 138 175% 0 138 176% 
Total for FY 2006 169 425 430 256 151% 5 261 155% 
Total for FY 2007 122 291 296 169 138% 4 173 142% 
Total all years 1,093 2,651 2,678 1,558 143% 27 1,585 145% 
Project Investment:  Amount invested in facility improvements     
Contract Price:  Contract cost to government      
Guaranteed Cost Savings: Reduction in energy/utility costs over length of contract   
Contractor Net:  Difference between contract price and project investment   
Contractor ROI:  Contractor return on investment (contractor net divided by project investment)  
Govt net (w/contract): Guaranteed cost savings less contract price    
Govt net (self invest); Guaranteed cost savings less project investment    
Govt (self invest) ROI: Govt net (self invest) divided by project investment    
  
Table 10.   All Government Super ESPC Data FY98-07  
[After: www1.eere.energy.gov, 2007] 
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Mandates to reduce energy consumption are a strong catalyst for improvement in 
installation energy efficient projects. Limited appropriated funding precludes many 
government agencies from funding their own energy efficient projects. ESPCs that 
increase fuel efficiency contribute to government agency efforts to comply with 
executive orders and other federal energy efficiency mandates. Noncompliance with 
theses mandates could incur negative budgetary or other policy ramifications. 
B. THE VALUE OF ENERGY AUDITS IN DETERMINING THE 
POTENTIAL FOR INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROJECTS 
This research discussed the role that energy audits play in determining the most 
effective use of investment dollars for domestic installation energy efficiency projects. 
First, some background on DoD energy usage and spending was provided. Next, an 
energy audit was defined followed by a discussion of military facility energy audit 
requirements. The three major types of energy audits were described with an explanation 
of energy conservation versus efficiency and methods for determining project cost 
effectiveness. An overview of EO 13423 illustrated mandated energy reduction 
requirements. Finally, conclusions regarding the continued use of energy audits at 
government installations were presented. 
The energy audit is a valuable first step in assessing economically viable energy 
efficiency projects. Through sound investment in energy efficiency, adherence to the 
laws requiring reductions in government installation energy intensity and emissions can 
be funded by reductions in utility expenditures. The reduced financial and environmental 
costs will allow the government to provide its citizenry with slightly reduced operating 
expenses and a cleaner environment. 
C. DEPLOYED INSTALLATION RESULTS: THE VALUE OF A TACTICAL 
GARBAGE-TO-ENERGY REFINERY (TGER) AT FORWARD 
OPERATING BASES 
Tactical bio-refineries address a present and recurring need in military operations. 
The United States Army and Marine Corps have expressed a consistent interest in this 
technology. Research and development efforts have produced a product that exceeds the 
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established requirements. If the TGER program continues to meet cost, schedule, and 
performance requirements, it has the potential for widespread dissemination and could 
provide a great service to the troops deployed in forward operating bases. 
Benefits of reducing fuel demand at remote locations include multiplicative 
saving effects on service fuel transportation costs in terms of dollars as indicated in  
Table 11 and immeasurable benefits from possible reductions in casualties. Fuel 
efficiency in deployed support equipment, vehicles, and bases frees scarce fuel resources 
to be used in higher priority, higher risk operating activities. Technologies that offer fuel 
savings should not be considered on the basis of the financial benefit of the fuel offset 
they provide, but rather on the total savings provided to the logistics system as a result of 
that fuel offset. Including system-wide fuel delivery costs changes the ROI and payback 
calculations compared to unburdened savings. Table 12 provides ROI calculations for 
unburdened fuel and waste savings and three burdened fuel and waste cost estimates 
based on TGER life expectancy. Like most equipment, the longer a TGER device will 
last, the greater its return on investment. Figure 19 shows payback periods for a $1.3 
million TGER by cost saving elements of burdened and unburdened fuel and waste. 
 
 Burdened Cost of Fuel Burdened Cost of Waste Disposal 
OSD (PA&E) Study $5.54/gal - 
LMI Study $20/gal $975/ton 
SMP Model $6.40/gal - 
Table 11.   Summary of Delivered Fuel and Waste Disposal Cost Estimates 
 
 
All dollar figures in FY07K$
Time Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Investment (initial cost difference) 1,275
Cumulative LMI Operating Savings 1,284 2,569 3,853 5,137 6,422 7,706 8,990 10,275 11,559 12,843
LMI Model ROI 1% 101% 202% 303% 404% 504% 605% 706% 807% 907%
Cumulative SMP Operating Savings 269 537 806 1,075 1,343 1,612 1,880 2,149 2,418 2,686
SMP Model ROI -79% -58% -37% -16% 5% 26% 47% 69% 90% 111%
Cumulative OSD Operating Savings 233 465 698 930 1,163 1,395 1,628 1,860 2,093 2,325
OSD Model ROI -82% -64% -45% -27% -9% 9% 28% 46% 64% 82%
Cumulative Unburdened Operating Savings 90 180 269 359 449 539 629 719 808 898
Unburdened ROI -93% -86% -79% -72% -65% -58% -51% -44% -37% -30%  


























Unburdened (Fuel and Waste) 
Fully Burdened (Waste Only)
Fully Burdened (Fuel Only)
Fully Burdened (Fuel and Waste)
 
Figure 19. TGER Payback Periods ($1.3M initial cost) 
 
D. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR INVESTMENT IN FUEL EFFICIENCY? 
Due to the difficulties in obtaining proper reimbursement for end-to-end costs of 
fuel delivery and its requirement to remain solvent as part of Working Capital Fund, 
Defense-Wide, it is not in the interest of DESC to pay for fuel delivery according to 
service-specific requirements. If cost savings are to be realized through the use of  
energy-efficient systems and energy-replacing systems, those savings will be realized by 
the individual services. Therefore, those services poised to realize the transportation 
savings have an incentive to incorporate energy efficiencies into their war-fighting 
operations. The extent to which these savings are distributed among support or O&M 
accounts should be dependent on the willingness of each accounts’ beneficiaries to invest 
in efficiency-producing services, practices, or goods. 
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E. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Possible areas for additional study that supplement this research include: 
• How the Tactical Garbage-to-Energy Refinery is progressing in the 
military acquisition process 
• How to create fuel efficiency financial incentives for military commanders 
• Comparing returns and risks of private ESPC investment to other market 
investments 
• Variability of fuel logistics costs in the military logistics system 
• Comparing projected and actual utility savings  
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